

THE CASE FOR NIGERIA AND A NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between the oil-rich nation of Nigeria and the oil-thirsty United States has been turbulent. The potential of Nigeria to emerge as a regional hegemon and strong trade partner, as well as Nigeria's place in the global political-economy of terrorism is redefining the relationship between the two countries. Analyzing the changing international relations, the politics and society of both nations, and their respective economies, this thesis explores how new post-Cold War policies have emerged and remain in flux. This thesis argues that Nigeria is a vital country for the United States and that appropriate policies towards Nigeria will help the United States develop influence in all of Africa. It emphasizes that the doctrine of containment from the Cold War must be replaced by policies that promote the development of Nigeria's infrastructure and a more diverse economy while respecting the complex identities of Nigeria's peoples.

PREFACE

This thesis analyzes the potential and need to redefine foreign relations for the United States in Nigeria. It defines a new era of foreign politics that is replacing the antiquated policies of the Cold War. I hope that this thesis contributes to serious discussion about the United States' presence in Nigeria and Africa as a whole. My choice to study the United States' foreign policy relating to Nigeria started with a military deployment to Niger in 2007. In the years since then, I found myself more and more drawn to the study of West Africa and in particular the uniqueness of Nigeria.

My research had led me to view the world, and myself, differently. I focused much of my research on government documents, particularly United States budget and congressional reports. I have studied the history and culture of Nigeria, and learned to appreciate the diversity of the African continent, and my connections to a country I have never visited. I even discovered that soldiers I served with, have been led by, and commanded are from Nigeria.

I am thankful that this educational journey was not completed alone. First, I must thank my father and dedicate this thesis to his memory. It is because of him I appreciate adversity. Secondly, I wish to thank my readers for their guidance and expertise. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Ronald Edsforth and Professor Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch. If it was not for your guidance and expertise, this would not have been possible.

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CHAPTER ONE

The 'War on Terror' has become the most important aspect of America's presence in the world. The justifications for this war have been used to invade countries, detain and interrogate peoples of varying nationalities, and spend trillions in the defense industry.¹ The political doctrine that governs the Global War on Terrorism (usually referred to as simply the 'War on Terror') acknowledges that it is in effect a war of influence in which non-state actors play a major role.² This war is increasingly vital to the United States of America in its relationship with Nigeria. Developing strong cooperative political, economic, and military relationships with Nigeria is now a critical necessity for American policy makers.

Modern Nigeria is a political state that originated as a British colony. It became independent in 1960. The country is situated in on the west coast of Africa along the Gulf of Guinea and was the closest British colony to the coveted Gold Coast, or present-day Ghana. Bordered by Benin to the east, Niger to the north, Chad and Cameroons to the West, Nigeria is located in a critical geographical area according to the current world political climate. Situated between trade routes via land to Saharan and sub-Saharan countries and trade routes via sea to Europe and the Americas, Nigeria is a strategically important location.

¹ 159 Cong Rec H 1574

² The War of Influence recognizes the impact of ideology synonymous with terrorism and the reality that force alone cannot compete on all fronts.

Currently consisting of thirty-six states, Nigeria has never truly settled on how to divide the country in political entities. The federal system of laws is based on British Common Law with examples of Islamic law in the North, and elements of traditional law at the local level.³ As of 2015, Nigeria has a population of 178.5 million,⁴ up 377% from its population level during the Nigerian Civil War in 1966. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and is emerging as the continent's largest economy.

Current scholarly work focused on the relationship between the United States and Nigeria primarily concentrates on the Cold War era. Scholarship on the relationship since the end of the Cold War is just emerging. The 9/11 terrorist attacks have provided the first significant cause for mutual cooperation between the countries beyond oil production. Additionally, much of the recent scholarly work either ignores or briefly discusses the role of ethnicity in United States and Nigerian relations. This thesis expands the narrative of this relationship in the post-9/11, world and focuses on how the internal Nigerian ethnic narrative is related to this international relationship. Ethnic constructionism (discussed in detail later) is a strong tool for analyzing the role of ethnicity in this recently formed global partnership.

In the United States there is a growing schism between calls for isolationism and supporters for foreign aid. Even those who support foreign aid seem to be divided on the purpose of the aid, especially whether such efforts should be made in the name of humanity, national security, and/or economic interests. Even outside of the political arena, in national discourse among the citizenry of the United States foreign aid seems to

³ Peter Kinglsey, *Country Nigeria*, 24.

⁴ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report," *The Economist*, February 2015, 16.

be a sensitive subject, especially because most American living standards have stagnated for decades.

Politically the United States still appears to invest in European countries. However, we are starting to see increased investment into various countries elsewhere including Africa. With the creation of the US Military's African Command (AFRICOM) in 2008, US military aid seems to be shifting from European countries to Africa; a region of the world where foreign investment and interventions have been increasing in recent years. AFRICOM was created as the last unified combatant command by the United States. Prior to the creation of this combatant command, the United States treated the African continent as a footnote to other military operations around the globe.⁵ Nigeria must be a focus country for the United States if it hopes to establish a strong and influential military presence on the continent. As terror groups such as Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Boko Haram operate in most of Africa, it is Boko Haram who has the most significant impact on the continent's most populous country.

By focusing on the West African nation of Nigeria, this thesis examines the complex motivations that go beyond humanitarianism to explain the growing US presence in this nation. Vast oil reserves, the presence of radical Islamic groups, and interactions with neighboring countries are among the factors this thesis will parse in its analysis of why the US role in Nigeria has been expanding and should continue to do so. Presently, China has expressed a clear interest in Nigeria and the resources it offers to the

⁵ Stephanie Hanson, "U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)," Council on Foreign Relations, May 7, 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/us-africa-command-africom/p13255>

world market. China has doubled its foreign investment in Nigeria between 2003 and 2005, primarily focusing on Nigeria's oil reserves.⁶ These efforts by China is a cause of major concern for the United States as China is quickly moving into Africa (and specifically Nigeria) to become the dominant superpower in the country which will result in major influential power over Nigeria.

This chapter discusses current scholarship and the contributions to the existing literature on US-Nigerian relations. It also presents a history of the political/military, economic, and religious developments that is designed to give the reader enough background information on Nigeria to provide the context for understanding United States and Nigerian relations between 2001-2014. This brief historical survey is divided into three sections: the birth of Nigeria from the vestiges of British colonial rule (1960-1967); the Nigerian Civil War, a.k.a. the Biafran War (1967-1970); and post-Civil War Nigeria (1967-2000). The latter section summarizes major governmental changes and historical events important for understanding Nigeria's international relations.

When discussing Nigeria one must deliberate on the impact of colonialism and ethnicity. That is not to say that these are the only two subjects that should be addressed, however, one would be remiss to leave out these two great influences on contemporary Nigeria. In fact, there is significant scholarship on these two subjects. Discussion of Nigeria's colonial legacy and its ethnic history however, sheds new light on the reasons

⁶ Gboyega Alabi Oyeranti, Musibau Adetunji Babatunde and E. Olawale Ogunkola 2011. "An Analysis of China-Nigerian investment relations." *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies* 4 (3): 184. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/896689796?accountid=10422>.

why Nigeria is militarily, economically, and politically important for the United States in the twenty-first century.

Most scholars agree that relations between the United States and Nigeria primarily focus on Nigeria's role in the regional politics in West Africa. These scholars agree on most of the reasons as to what motivates this relationship. However, they diverge on how to prioritize these reasons. John A. Ayam, places significant emphasis on the Cold War.⁷ Ayam writes that "[i]nteraction between the two countries in the 1960's was influenced by U.S. policy of containment and Nigeria's non-aligned posture.⁸ John De St. Jorre disputes Ayam's interpretation by saying that during the time of the Biafran War the United States did not feel the need to get involved in Nigerian internal affairs.⁹ American noninvolvement in the Biafran War gave a significant advantage to the Soviet Union to establish a presence in Africa. In fact, Nigeria received arms from Russia during this time.¹⁰

The War on Terror changes the narrative of relations between the United States and Nigeria. Almost all scholars agree that Nigeria has a significant level of influence in the region, and that it can be a powerful ally in creating long lasting relations with many countries of West Africa. Interestingly, the power of Nigerian influence is best analyzed by looking at the Angolan question¹¹ and efforts to end apartheid in South Africa. Smart

⁷ John A. Ayam 2008. "The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations." *Journal of Third World Studies* 25 (2): 117. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/59894580?accountid=10422>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), 179.

¹⁰ Smart Uhakheme, *Nigeria – United States Relations* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), 11.

¹¹ The "Angolan Question" refers to the tense relationship between the United States and Nigeria as each country supported competing groups for control of Angola, which caused severe tension between the countries.

Uhakheme outlines that Nigeria viewed the apartheid regime as an affront to Nigeria itself, and that it risked its own health with sanctions on the US.¹² Uhakheme also explains that the United States position in both situations clearly depended on economic motivations and the Cold War.¹³ Nigeria certainly played a role in pan-African political efforts and will continue to do so. As a result, we must analyze Nigeria itself to best understand the motivations behind its regional and global policies.

Authors Thomas Davis and Azubike Kalu-Nwivu argue that Nigeria, at its inception as a country was simply a name and lines drawn on a map.¹⁴ During the competition to establish colonies of Africa, European powers formed nations with little¹⁵ regard to the cultural and ethnic makeup of their colonies. They were more concerned with the resources of conquered lands blocking the expansion of rivals, and what they regarded as their “civilizing mission.” The Europeans typically used divide and rule strategies that embedded ethnic tensions in national politics. Ethnic tensions have complicated uniting Nigeria as a whole. Nathaniel Umukoro states that a democratic Nigeria, “[...] has failed to reduce inequality successfully because the contributing factors to the persistence of inequality in Nigeria have not been addressed.”¹⁶ Umukoro attributes this lack of attention to gender, regionally, and political inequalities, and to the

¹² Ibid., 72.

¹³ Ibid., 72-73.

¹⁴ Thomas J. Davis et. Al., “Education, Ethnicity, and National Integration in the History of Nigeria: Continuing Problems of Africa’s Colonial History,” *The Journal of Negro History* 86, (1) (2001): 1.

¹⁵

¹⁶ Nathaniel Umukoro. "Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria." *Journal of Developing Societies* 30, no. 1 (2014): 20.

importance placed on the increasing attention to regional¹⁷ (and in turn ethnic) politics over issues of national concern.

Colonial rule had a lasting impact on Nigeria regarding ethnicity and the relationship between various groups. Most scholars accept that the British method of controlling Northern Nigeria during the colonial period (via indirect rule) was a major contributor to increased ethnic tensions. Some also seem to see indirect rule as a starting point of ethnic tension within Nigeria. Muhammad Umar, does not necessarily disagree that ethnic tensions began as a result of British rule, but emphasizes that the concept of indirect rule started with the Sokoto Caliphate before British rule.¹⁸

The importance of the Sokoto Caliphate directly relates to the development of the terror group Boko Haram discussed in Chapter Two. Both of these groups developed under the pretense of an Islamic *jihad*, or ‘holy war.’ The Sokoto Caliphate sought to bring a suitable Islamic society to Northern Nigeria and with it a system of governance that reported directly to the Sultan of Sokoto.¹⁹ The idea of the Sokoto Caliphate was that individual emirates would rule their given areas, yet pledge adherence to the Sultan.²⁰ This system allowed the British to defeat one controlling entity and keep an existing system of government in the North.

¹⁷ Referring to internal regional politics and not Nigeria’s role in West Africa

¹⁸ Muhammad S. Umar, “Hausa traditional political culture” in *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*, ed. Wale Adebani, Ebenezer Obadare, and Larry Diamond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 185.

¹⁹ Jonathan T. Reynolds, “The Politics of History: The Legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria,” *The Journal of Asian and African Studies*, no. 32 (1997) 51.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Deceptive British colonial practices are also well documented. J.O. Iruwru explains that the British methods for gaining control of Nigeria was contemptible. The British would make agreements with tribal leaders/kings and then falsely accuse them of failing to fulfill duties under those agreements and arrest them under false pretenses. Iruwru explains that if the British were not able to arrest the king, they simply would wipe out the group.²¹

Many of these bad-faith treaties that Iruwru discusses occurred in the West and East regions of Nigeria. The North, a predominantly Muslim community controlled by the Sokoto Caliphate was left to rule with British administrative oversight. These different methods of gaining control of Southern Nigeria (the East and West Regions) versus the method of gaining control in Northern Nigeria can be seen as favoritism by the British. This policy also had a lasting effect on ethnic relations and the Nigerian Civil War.

Section One: The Birth of Nigeria

Nigeria became an independent country on October 1, 1960 after decades of subjugation under British colonial rule. This complex nation has become the land of “simplified 3’s.” The narrative of Nigeria as a young nation focuses on three main ethnicities, three main religions, and three provincial regions. Nigeria is extremely diverse in all three of these categories, however, current scholarship relies on these broad categorical references.

²¹ J.O. Iruwru, *Nigeria at 100: What next?* (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2014), 5-6.

Ethnically, Nigeria is diverse; with over 250 distinguishable groups.²² Diverse culture and languages play a large role in the political formation of Nigeria, both at its inception and in recent years. The three main ethnic groups are: the Ibos (sometimes written as Igbo), the Yorubas, and the Hausa-Fulanis.²³ Fasiku Gbenga analyzes how ethnicities are created or identified. Gbenga discusses the difference between Ethnic Naturalism and Ethnic Constructionism. This concept will play a role later when discussing the future of Nigeria and the role of ethnicity in the modern era. Naturalism, Gbenga argues is based on genetics and other ‘natural phenomenon’ outside of human control,²⁴ whereas constructionism is based on “empirically observed effect[s] believed to be caused by some social and natural phenomena.”²⁵ Ethnic Constructionism has more significance when discussing modern Nigerian politics and social construction. For this reason, ethnic identity cannot be fixed as unchanging over time.

The second “3’s” is religion. Most scholars group Nigeria into three religious categories. These religions are Christianity, Islam, and traditional. The latter generic label fails to acknowledge the real diversity of religious beliefs in the country. Scholars are inclined to group each religion with ethnic groups. Generally, Ibo’s are correlated with Christianity, Hausa-Fulani with Islam, Yoruba as a mix of both religions²⁶, and smaller ethnic groups with traditional religious practices.

²² Clarence J. Bouchat, *Causes of Instability in Nigeria and Implications for the United States*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 1.

²³ The Hausa’s and Fulani’s were two separate groups that merged together through during the Muslim expansion of the North, and in particular through the efforts of the Sokoto Caliphate. Throughout the paper, the term Hausa and Hausa-Fulani are used interchangeably unless specifically noted.

²⁴ Fasiku Gbenga, “Ethnicity in Nigeria,” *Philosophia Africana* 2, no.2 (2008) 142.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 144.

²⁶ Bouchat, *Causes of Instability*, 21.

Though this generalization deserves critique, it is not incorrect to identify each of these religions with these groups. It is however, important to note that many of these groups kept some form of their traditional roots in the practice of their faiths. For instance, such as the practice of facial marks continued to be used by the Muslim dominated Hausa, even after the practice dwindled during the slave trade.²⁷

The third and final category that generally describes Nigeria is the layout of regions. The country is divided into the North Region, the West Region, and the East Region. Later in this thesis a fourth region will be discussed called the Mid-West region. The three original regions also have been correlated with religious and ethnic identities. The North is dominated with Hausa-Fulani Muslims, the East with Ibo Christians, and West by the Yorubas, who are generally viewed as a mix of Christians and Muslims.

Of the 250 plus ethnic groups, only 10 groups make up 80 percent of the population. Of those 10 groups, only three dominant the Nigerian political arena. The Hausa-Fulani comprise twenty-eight percent of the nation's population, the Yoruba totaling twenty percent, and the Ibo's counting for seventeen percent. These three ethnic groups hold enormous power and influence.²⁸ The overall religious make up of Nigeria is fifty percent Muslim, forty percent Christian, and ten percent identifying with traditional beliefs²⁹ There is a noteworthy difference in the ethnic makeup of Nigeria its differing religious structure.

²⁷ Egodi Uchendu, "Being Igbo and Muslim," *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010) 70-71. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0021853709990764

²⁸ De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 15.

²⁹ Peter Kingsley. "Country Nigeria," *Political Insight*, April 2013, 24.

Ethnicity and religion, (in particular during the independence era of Nigeria) were manipulated to draw both alliances and schisms between groups. This method of control has deep roots in how Britain controlled Nigeria as a colony. All too often ethnicity was used by political leaders (both in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria) as a means to gain political power and clout, often at the cost of another group. This method inevitably resulted in violence. Author Clarence Bouchat explains that violence was so uncontrollable that Nigeria banned political organizations from identifying via a religious group or identity.³⁰ However, due to weak government and extensive corruption during the post-colonial era, ethnicity has proven to be a fallback communal point.³¹ This would be a departure from Britain's use of ethnicity in colonial era, as it relied heavily on the strength of ethnic identity and their ability to control the leaders of any given ethnic group. Adedayo O. Adekson supports this claim by acknowledging ethnicity's role in the absence of basic social and economic groups (i.e. a middle class or wealthy class of people).³²

Nigerian political groups were created along religious/ethnic lines. The Action Group (AG) from the Western Region comprised mainly of Yoruba was founded by Egbe Omo Oduduwa. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), represented Hausa-Fulani from the North. Lastly, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), consisted of Eastern Region Ibos.³³ The creation of these political groups and later ban on religious affiliation could be seen as an

³⁰ Bouchat, *Causes of Instability*, 26.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

³² Adedayo O. Adekson, "'Civil' or 'Uncivil' Society? Revisiting the Proliferation of Ethnic Organizations in Southern Nigeria," in *State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria*, ed. Mojúbàolú Okome, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 65.

³³ Bouchat, *Causes of Instability*, 25.

assault against belief systems, in particular with the north where Muslims do not acknowledge a difference between religious or political power, and see religious power as justification for the latter. This justification is significant in the adoptions of Sharia law in the North.³⁴

The Northern People's Congress, headed by Ahmadu Bello had initially worked with the NCNC to control the federal government during the immediate post-independence period.³⁵ This relationship soon soured and the divide that turned violent. The NCNC, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe developed a strong relationship with the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), one of the two separatists groups in the Western Region when the Action Group dissolved. The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), the second separatist group, developed strong ties with the NPC and caused the West Region to become a hotbed of political turmoil³⁶ between the Muslim North and Christian East where political rhetoric became an extension of religious and ethnic narratives.

It is possible that the initial cooperation between the NPC and NCNC caused the disillusioned Action Group to crumble from within leaving the West open for political influence and ultimately to fight for control of the federal government between the NPC and NCNC. O. Balagun writes, "[... with] a bitter rift in the Action Group, [...] the Federal government was controlled at the time of Nigeria's accession to independence by a coalition of two major political parties [the NCNC and NPC]."³⁷

³⁴ Ibid., 21.

³⁵ Ola Balagun, *The Tragic Years* (Benin: Ethiope Publishing Corp, 1973), 16.

³⁶ Ibid., 16-18.

³⁷ Ibid., 16.

Until the Nigerian Civil War which occurred between 1967 and 1970, religious identity often blurred ethnic lines, as one could find people converting religions from the dominate religion of their ethnic group. One example would be the Ibos. Many Ibos converted from Christianity and Traditional belief systems to Islam. Converted Ibos returning to the Eastern Region as a result of ethnic tensions and an impending civil war highlighted these blurred lines. These conversions primarily occurred during the colonial period. It was not until Nigeria became an independent nation that transcending ethnic and religious groups became difficult. This difficulty was demonstrated by people being sent to areas of Nigeria based on their ethnicity during the buildup to the Biafran War. This process has no regard to situations where people never had lived in the ‘homeland’ of their ethnicity.

Ibos, concentrated in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, were often identified as Christian, in part due to the arrival of western missionaries from imperialistic nations. However, Western influence only reached areas which had economic value to the colonists. Western religion, Christianity, would only reach so far and no longer become influential. As a result, Islam was the first “imported” religion in Northern Igboland³⁸, as the influence of Christian churches never really made it from extended beyond the southern parts of the country or shores of its central waterways. This created a quagmire over strict identification of religious affinity as it relates to ethnicity. This created a type of ‘no man’s land’ once Nigeria became an independent state reliant on ethnic and religious identity.

³⁸ Igboland is the name given to the Eastern region that acknowledged Ibos are the dominate ethnicity, just was the West Region is referred to the Yorubaland.

The northern parts of the East Region Owerri, Abakaliki, and Enohia, saw many Ibos convert to Islam. Enohia had the most converts.³⁹ Furthermore, Owerri Ibo's adoption of Islam as early as the 1930's⁴⁰ shows that Islam was not strictly for the Northern Region of Nigeria, as Owerri is only about forty-six miles from the major port city of Port Harcourt. This Ibo connection to the Muslim north continued. Prior to the 1950s Igbo Muslims would send their children (male) to other areas of Nigeria to include Northern Nigeria to study the Quran.⁴¹ The first group of Ibo Muslims did not study the Quran until the 1950s and the first Islamic school was not created in Igboland until 1958⁴².

Constructionism explains why Ibo's converted to Islam as early as the 1930s, yet it was not until the 1950s that the Quran was study in Iboland.⁴³ Victor Uchendu suggests that there were other ties, possibly economic, that existed between Northern Nigeria and Northern Igboland that influenced the conversion of Ibos to Islam. This is not all too far-fetched given Islam came to Nigeria about two centuries before Christianity.⁴⁴ Arab Expansionism via Northern African trade routes are attributed to constructing the Hausa-Fulani ethnicity in Nigeria as we currently understand the group. During the first generations of Igbo conversions to Islam, those converts spoke highly of the Hausa, believing that their cultural identity best suited the life of a Muslim.⁴⁵

³⁹ Uchendu, *Being Igbo and Muslim*, 65.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 72.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁴⁴ Adedayo O. Adekson, "Civil" or "Uncivil" Society?, 67 (State Fragility).

⁴⁵ Uchendu. *Being Igbo and Muslim*, 76.

It would be superficial to assume that the atrocities of violence between ethnic groups was purely “ethnic.” Often elites vied for the same resources and built on “tribalism” and ethnic tensions to achieve their goals of controlling the Nigerian economy.⁴⁶ This method of control founded in the method of the British protectorate system and Sokoto Caliphate continued throughout Nigeria in the 20th century. Arguably, this method of control exists into present day Nigerian politics. The British method of colonial rule that created this animosity is discussed shortly. O. Balagun explains that even in the Northern Region, where Islam is just as important religiously as it is politically, many of the residents still hold onto traditional belief systems and do not participate in Islam, while there still is some degree of “cultural affinity” to being a “Northerner.”⁴⁷ This identity is seeded in the method of control chosen by the British which relied on self-governance by the ruling elite of the Northern Protectorate.

The relationship between the three major ethnic groups is complex and influential in national politics. Adedayo O. Adekson states that, “what makes ethnicity especially volatile in Nigeria is the manner in which it is inextricably linked with and delicately superimposed upon Indigenous Religious Traditions, Christianity, and Islam.”⁴⁸ The Hausa believe that the Yorubas are an “illegitimate branch of Hausa.”⁴⁹ This view helps explain the Hausa feel superior, at least regarding the Yoruba. This superiority could have been easily reinforced by British indirect rule during the colonial period, when the

⁴⁶ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 73.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 65-66.

⁴⁸ Adedayo O. Adekson, “Civil” or “Uncivil” Society?, 66.

⁴⁹ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 66.

Hausa-Fulani were the only group that was able to govern themselves according to their own cultural norms.

During the occupation by Britain, Nigeria experienced several important changes in its governance. Initially the British combined the North and South Protectorates as a single entity, what we know as Nigeria. The colonial creations of Nigeria were not specific to Ibo, Yoruba, or Hausa-Fulani identity, which resulted in little to no sense of unity between any Nigerian groups prior to independence as Nigeria.⁵⁰ Lord Fredrick Luggard took the initial step of allowing Northern Nigerian autonomy. This policy created animosity towards the North in Southern Nigeria. Although not independent, Northern Nigeria continued to operate in that manner with British oversight until 1960.⁵¹

Changes to the political institutions of Nigeria occurred several times under British rule starting from 1922 until independence. Each change was referred to as a 'constitution' and named after the current governing British official. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 was the first major change to colonial governance of Nigeria. J. O. Irukwu explains that this constitution was the first time the elective principle was adopted for the country.⁵² This meant that through "limited male adult franchise" four of twenty-seven unofficial legislative council members were elected to office.⁵³

The Richard Constitution of 1946 followed the Clifford Constitution. The Richard Constitution had the most significant impact on present day Nigerian politics due because

⁵⁰ Bouchat, *Causes of Instability*, 6.

⁵¹ Sir Frederick Luggard Anthony H.M. Kirk-Green, comp., *Luggard and the amalgamation of Nigeria* (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1968), 55.

⁵² Irukwu, *Nigeria @100: Early History*, 10.

⁵³ Ibid.

it created regional governments. Prior to the Richard Constitution, the country did not formalize regional governance. J.O. Irukwu states that the creation of political regions was a British attempt to quell independence talks among Nigerians.⁵⁴ For the first time, the Richard Constitution allowed the creation of political parties among Nigerians.⁵⁵ O. Balagun writes "...[the Richard Constitution] provided for a central legislature for the whole of Nigeria and for three Regional houses of assembly, one for each of three administrative units which made up the Federation of Nigeria."⁵⁶

The last two constitutions prior to Nigerian independence also made important changes. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 was the first constitution developed by Nigerians and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 prepared Nigeria to become its own country.⁵⁷ The Lyttleton Constitution reinforced the internal political design of a North, West, and East regional governance system for internal control established by the Richard Constitution.⁵⁸ This reinforcement of regional governments deepened ethnic boundaries and prepared the road to civil war.

British efforts to keep Nigeria weak and dependent on Britain in order to benefit from natural resources created war. The relationships of the aforementioned ethnic groups, religions, and political entities played a pivotal role in how the civil war started and ended. The development of various political groups, especially the NCNC and NPC deepened the ethnic narrative initially created in the colonial era and resulted in

⁵⁴ Ibid., 13.

⁵⁵ Rotimi W. Omotoye and Elisabeth DeCampos, "The Role of the Christian Church in Building Civil Society in Nigeria," in *State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security* ed. Mojúbàolú Okome, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 210.

⁵⁶ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 12.

⁵⁷ Irukwu, *Nigeria @100: Early History*, 13-14.

⁵⁸ Bouchat, *Causes of Instability*, 39.

bloodshed. The conclusion of the civil war showed the resolve of Nigeria, and demonstrated hope for the country. Nigeria's refusal for British aid after the civil war shows that there remains concern of British influence and control in the minds of Nigerians.

Nigerian politicians did not discuss the overall status of Nigerian affairs without some discussion of personal gain. Personal gains were linked to ethnic driven calls to maintain or gain economic, political, and social privileges over other ethnic groups.⁵⁹ This political method is still present in the modern Nigerian political arena.⁶⁰ Whether ethical or not, Nigerian politicians use this ethnic driven discourse to maintain power, control, and social standing which are tactics deeply rooted in the method of colonial governance by the British.

Section Two: The Nigerian Civil / Biafran War

“One of the basic requirements for a successful coup is that the plotters must be certain of their mutual reliability. In the newly emergent African nations, a common tribal origin often guarantees mutual loyalty, and it is perhaps not unnatural that the plotters should have congregated on a tribal basis, since it was important that they should be able to trust each other.” ~ Ola Balagun discussing the Nigerian Civil War

⁵⁹ Adedayo O. Adekson, “Civil” or “Uncivil” Society?, 65.

⁶⁰ Toyin Fayola Lecture. “Convention, Culture, and Corruption: Democracy in Africa.” Lecture, Plymouth State University, Plymouth, NH, March 9, 2015.

Biafra is the story of a three-year secession of the East Region of Nigeria and the bloody battle that followed. Among many factors, Biafra used an ethnic narrative to fuel violence.

In January of 1966, politicians were embroiled in corrupt and violent actions in the Western Region. A *coop d'état* was planned and executed by Ibo officers in response to this corruption.⁶¹ This corruption resulted in fledging political will in the Western Region and the dissolution of the main political party of the west known as the Action Group (AG). The Action Group no longer existed and created a vacuum of power in the West. The *coop d'état* led to the first military rule of Nigeria under General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Ibo. By design, this group of officers were strictly Ibo, not for political reasons, but to ensure mutual trust.

The first step to laying a foundation for secession was Gen. Ironsi's reinforcement of what the Richard Constitution had created, the emphasis on Regional or Provincial governments. N.U. Akpan, the Chief Secretary for Biafra wrote, "[f]ollowing the military take-over in January 1966 the Nigerian Constitution had been suspended in parts, mainly those parts relating to politicians and political institutions."⁶² Military governors for each regional government. In the case of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu was appointed as the military governor. These appointments not only served as a 'head of state' for their region, but as their regions representation to Maj. General Ironsi in Lagos.⁶³

⁶¹ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 1.

⁶² Ntieyong U. Akpan, *The struggle for secession* (New York: Frank Cass and Company, 1972), 28.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 28.

Initially the new Ironsi government had support across the country. However, Ironsi became increasingly viewed as inept and self-involved to the detriment of the country.⁶⁴ The degradation of credibility of the Ironsi regime started to raise support for politicians who were once seen as corrupt, particularly in the North.⁶⁵ Changes in the Nigerian political landscape brought an ethnic narrative that would lead to war. Gen. Ironsi's government started to appear incompetent, and many felt that the government was now signaling Ibo domination for all of Nigeria.⁶⁶

It is unclear as to how fighting actually started, but O. Balagun explains that, "on the night of 28 July fighting broke out at Abeokuta barracks in Western Nigeria, between soldiers of Northern origin and their Eastern counterparts," and as a result three Eastern officers were shot while Northern officers sought to seize weapons and ammunition.⁶⁷ The August 9th decision of the military governors to require all soldiers who were from a particular region to return and serve in the region was a sign of things to come.⁶⁸ It is not clear if this decision was based on actual residence or identified ethnic affiliation. This question is complicated because Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the military governor of the East, an Ibo, was born and had lived mostly in the North, except for his time in Britain and a short time in the East before joining the military.⁶⁹ Here we see a struggle between ethnic naturalism and ethnic constructionism in Nigeria.

⁶⁴ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 26.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 28.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 57.

⁶⁹ Akpan, *The struggle for secession*, 20.

Ojukwu's ties to the East seemed loose. He eventually gained enough influence and was able to manipulate the East Region's will to inescapably support secession from Nigeria. Chief Secretary of Biafra Akpan writes, "[...] the majority of people in the former Eastern Nigeria, including the Ibos, did not initially support secession, and would have rejected the whole idea if then had been freely and fairly consulted." Lt. Col Ojukwu utilized two sources to drum up support for seceding; the action of the Northern officers in the "July coup" (the killing of those Eastern officers to gain weapons) and an event known as the "September Massacres" that resulted in the return of millions of Easterners to the East Region.⁷⁰

These events instilled a true loyalty to ones' ethnicity rather than one's country. Leaders of the government were putting one's ethnicity before one's country. Ojukwu was able to easily manipulate the public after blood was shed. The July coup and September massacres made it easy to create a dichotomy of "Us vs. Them," in turn creating a Biafran Exceptionalism needed for war. The created exceptionalism drove Igboland (or the East Region) and its inhabitants to support the secession and creation of Biafra. Women of Biafra fought to be armed in hopes of killing General Gowon and children left their schools to "preach hatred and violence" against federal forces.⁷¹

Ojukwu's first indications that the East was going to secede occurred during a meeting of military governors in January of 1967. Ojukwu was able to gain decisions in these meetings that would give the East a supply of troops, increased weapons and

⁷⁰ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 57. The September Massacres is an event that happened late September 1966 where Ibos attacked Northerners in the east and the North Retaliated.

⁷¹ Akpan, *The struggle for secession*, 67.

ammunition supplies, and give him autonomy in the East to work with minimal worry of exposing a plan to leave Nigeria.⁷² While support for succession was gaining momentum, not all of the leadership believed it was a good idea. Chief Secretary Akpan felt that succession would set back many Ibos in the West and Mid-West Regions of Nigeria.⁷³ The West and Mid-West regions demonstrated allegiance with the North and in turn keeping Nigeria united. Akpan, often critical of Ojukwu, stated a major flaw of Ojukwu was keeping like-minded advisors developing into a devastating case of ‘groupthink.’⁷⁴

Prior to declaring Biafra an independent nation, Ojukwu started a campaign where the intention was to disrupt the federal government and give justification by result (and not desire), for Biafra to secede. Beginning in September 1966, attacks included the explosions at the Federal Palace Hotel, the Ore Bridge, and the Nigerian Police Force Headquarters.⁷⁵

On May 30, 1967 the ‘Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra’ was read. It clearly established a feud with the North and attempted to relate this feud with the West. In the proclamation, in part it states:

“In course of time, the people of other parts of Southern Nigeria found that they possessed many things in common with those of Eastern Nigeria, and while the colonial master made adjustments to accommodate these common ties between Southern inhabitants, the peoples of the North insisted on maintaining their separateness.”⁷⁶

⁷² Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 58.

⁷³ Akpan, *The struggle for secession*, 79.

⁷⁴ Akpan, *The struggle for secession*, 20.

⁷⁵ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 79.

⁷⁶ Republic of Biafra, *Proclamation of Biafra*, 1967 (Enugu, 1967), 1.

The Biafran War commenced with General Yakubu Gowon at the head of Federal Forces and (now) General Ojukwu at the helm of Biafran Forces. For the most part, the civil war was an internal struggle. Outside countries did offer some support, mainly in the form of munitions. The United States and Britain were careful not to outwardly support one side over the other, whereas the French covertly supported Biafra. The Russians and Chinese started to make a push for influence in the region by providing support to the Federal Forces of Nigeria.⁷⁷

On July 6, 1966, the civil war's violent struggle started, and as John de St. Jorre described, "[...] cost nearly a million lives and plunged Africa into unparalleled disarray."⁷⁸ During the first stages of the Nigerian Civil War, Ojukwu and Gowon started to fight along the northern border of Biafra. During this time, Ojukwu sent troops to the capital of Benin State and attempted to get the Yoruba's to align with Biafra. He was unsuccessful and in turn the effort was counter-productive and the Federal Alliance of Nigeria strengthen.⁷⁹

Ojukwu's attempt to strengthen the Biafran position by creating North/South divide opened him up for a not only attacks from the Northern border of Biafra, but strengthen the idea that Nigeria was in fact a whole country with national pride that did not subscribe to the "colonial project" narrative it once did. N. U. Akpan explains that, "Col Ojukwu's strategy to prop up his irrevocable decision to remove Western Nigeria

⁷⁷ Eghosa Osaghae, *Crippled Giant* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),105.

⁷⁸ De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 125.

⁷⁹ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 84-85.

from the federation and to fight the North when the opportunity occurred [believing that this fight was ethnically based and that the influence of Hausas must be ended].”⁸⁰

This war had started as a fight between the North and East. But as Akpan explains, the war quickly turned into the East versus everyone else due to the Yoruba’s (West and Mid-West Region’s) decision not to side with Ojukwu.⁸¹ Ojukwu probably viewed the Yoruba in alliance with the Hausa in an ethnic battle of survival.

The three-year battle to establish Biafra ultimately failed and Nigeria remained a ‘whole’ country. On January 12th 1970, preceded by Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony, Major-General Philip Effiong (the soldier that replaced Ojukwu who fled the country due to the impending surrender of Biafra) announced Biafra had lost the war and would soon offer a formal surrender to General Gowon.⁸² Three days later, in Lagos, Effiong gave his surrender to General Gowon for the country of Biafra. Describing this historic day, a European reporter made a remarkable observation at the news of this surrender.

“To me the newsroom of the Nigerian Observer, will always remain an unforgettable scene. Members of the corporation’s staff from every department and representing practically every tribe that make up this multi-ethnic state and, yes, Ibos too, had huddled around the radio, tense and expectant. Exactly at four-thirty p.m. [...], in a short speech [Effiong] announced the capitulation and threw Biafra at the mercy of General Gowon. There were no cheers, no jubilation or arrangements for celebrations. Most of the listeners had tears in their eyes and the editor wept.”⁸³
~Edward Swangard

⁸⁰ Akpan, *The struggle for secession*, 65.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁸² De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 400.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 400.

Gowon's historical reputation is based on how he handled the victory. Gowon had given no indication that he would adopt a sweeping policy of amnesty for those who had fought for Biafra. Akpan and even Ojukwu, would return to Nigeria without fear of reprisal. "[The amnesty policy was] keeping with the general sentiment [that] joy of reconciliation was far stronger than desire for recrimination on both sides."⁸⁴ At the conclusion of the war Gowon focused on rebuilding with the message that he cared for all of Nigeria, including the Ibos of the East.⁸⁵

Section Three: Nigeria post 1970 to 2000

General Gowon's rule started during the initial stages of the civil war and continued rule until 1979. Gowon issued an unfulfilled promise that Nigeria would return to civilian rule by 1972.⁸⁶ Nigeria was led by military rule between 1966 and 1979; then again in 1983 through 1996. Major administration changes occurred three times. General Muhammadu Buhari, General Ibrahim Babangida, and General Sani Abacha each led the government.

Beyond the historical lineage of Nigerian governments, certain areas of concern, in particular those social in nature, continued to plague Nigeria throughout the end of the twentieth century. Scholar Nathaniel Umukoro describes this inequality by categorizing it in three dimensions; economic, gender, and regional.⁸⁷ The politics of regional inequalities are far more destabilizing than those of any other category. Regional

⁸⁴ Balagun, *The Tragic Years*, 113.

⁸⁵ De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, 406.

⁸⁶ Osaghae, *Crippled Giant*, 70.

⁸⁷ Umukoro, *Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria*, 3.

inequalities have demonstrated the greatest potential for violence. Solving regional inequalities would allow higher success potential for dealing with other problems.

In the latter parts of the twentieth century, oil revenue became a focal point in disputes over regional inequality. Most oil reserves lie under a small portion of the country in the southeast area; an area with Ibo majorities. Defining regional inequality as “a situation in which differences exist between two or more regions in terms of economic, social, political, and other opportunities, which [causes] a region to be ahead of other regions⁸⁸,” regional inequality in respect to oil revenue greatly influences the politics of the country as a whole.

Regional disproportionalities are important when discussing Nigerian poverty. Umukoro charts poverty rates from 1980 through 2010. There is an increase of 23.1 percent of Nigerians who are considered extremely poor and 15.3 percent who are listed as moderately poor through 1996.⁸⁹ Umukoro is not clear on the definition of each category, though he does explain that these groups live off of one to two dollars per day. Umukoro identifies that all three zones of Northern Nigeria have been consistently poor between 1980 and 2010, whereas it has only been since 1996 that southern zones have had similar levels of poverty.⁹⁰

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger personally engaged in the acquisition of Nigerian oil for the United States in the 1970's.⁹¹ The oil boom for Nigeria has continued to the present day. By the mid 1990's, Nigeria was a formidable supplier of

⁸⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁹¹ U.S. Department of State, *TELCON Transcript between Sec. Kissinger and Dep. Sec. Charles Robinson, 1976* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005)

crude oil. By 1995, Nigeria had the fourteenth largest oil reserve in the world and it was expected that the best years for Nigeria would not be reached until the twenty-first century.⁹² Between 1995 and 2010, Nigeria has consistently been the fifth largest oil supplier to the United States.⁹³

In 1977 the Aboyade Technical Committee was formed to address the distribution of the national wealth, especially that from oil production. The committee mandated how all federally collected revenue would be distributed. It required that federal funds be distributed to the federal government, state government, and local governments at a rate of fifty-seven percent, thirty percent, and ten percent respectively. The remaining three percent would be reserved for special grants.⁹⁴

In 1979, the ‘Second Republic’ was established.⁹⁵ It diverged from parliamentary style of government by creating a more ‘Americanized’ presidential form of government. The Second Republic rejected the British model. It was hoped that it would prevent military coup d’états that had plagued the country. These efforts failed as Major General Muhammadu Buhari seized control in 1983 ending the Second Republic.

A major time period during the later portion of the 20th century focuses on the 1980’s and role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The policies of these organizations had a significant negative impact on the development of many countries including Nigeria. Professors Sola Fajana and Adejoke Ige explain that

⁹² Joseph P. Riva Jr., *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Oil Past, Present and Future*, 1994 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1994), 17-18.

⁹³ U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum and other Liquids,” http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impqus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm (accessed December 10, 2015).

⁹⁴ Osaghae, *Crippled Giant*, 92-93.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.

the IMF in particular developed programs that lead to greater instability in Nigeria. They explain that the conditions tied to the financial relief offer by the IMF prevented funds to be used as a method to increase worker wages. As a result of increasing cost and no method to increase wages, the perception of inequality increased along with violence.⁹⁶

Zlara Hajro and Joseph Joyce in *Applied Economics* explain that IMF programs such as the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) program were created to facilitate growth. They explain that the SAF had a negative impact due to the single scope focus on the exportation of goods. They argue that since the program focused on exports, only those who have exports will gain. In developing countries such as Nigeria, this group of people tend to be farmers. As a result, cost-of-living increases due to overall growth yet urban people and others who do not export goods fail to maintain the same level of growth. As a result, only farmers see positive gain and the urban poor fall further into poverty.⁹⁷

As Nigeria progressed into the 1990's, turbulent times remained. The continued presence of western corporations caused strained relations between the populous and economic interests of the government. This strain ultimately led to bloodshed, in particular in the Niger Delta region. The Royal Dutch Shell Company (aka Shell Oil) had a major presence in Nigeria and a comparable level of influence in their government.

⁹⁶ Sola Fajana and Adejoke Ige, "The IMF and industrial relations dimension of instability in post-independent Nigeria," *African Journal of Business Management* 3, no. 3 (2009): 120.

⁹⁷ Zlara Hajro and Joseph P. Joyce, "A true test: do IMF programs hurt the poor?," *Applied Economics* 41, no. 3(2009): 296.

During this time period, Shell Oil was not without controversy, especially as it related to pollution and human rights. Shell Oil combated repeated calls to leave the Nigeria due to its oppressive military regime.⁹⁸ James Russell in an article published in the *Journal of Human Rights* argues that for some, Shell Oil was complicit in the murder of Nigerian environmental activist and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Sara-Wiwa.⁹⁹ Though the intent of this thesis is not to dissect the role of western entities, it is important to acknowledge the negative impact foreign entities had during the young years of Nigeria's independence.

Today, Nigeria has developed from a three regional provincial country to its current formation of a 36 state system with a federal territory developed in 1996.¹⁰⁰ Nigeria boasts the largest population and economy in all of Africa. The country is facing profound challenges on both domestic and international issues. These challenges are making the country a more relevant nation in the eyes of every super-power. Nigeria is in prime position to be a partner for the United States in order for the United States to develop and open new markets and true world partnership with the leading nation of a great continent.

⁹⁸ James M. Russell, "The ambivalence about the globalization of telecommunications: the story of Amnesty International, Shell Oil Company and Nigeria," *Journal of Human Rights* 1, no. 3 (2002): 414.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 410-411.

¹⁰⁰ Osaghae, *Crippled Giant*, xxvi.

CHAPTER TWO

In 1999, Nigeria returned to a loosely democratically elected form of government. When President Olusegun Obasanjo first took office claims about vote rigging, intimidation, and ballot stuffing dominated the conversation. However, disputed the election, it was a success because it applied principles of democracy and allowed some differing voices to be heard. It opened an opportunity for further democratic principles to be adopted demonstrated by the President Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari defeated incumbent Goodluck Jonathan in spring of 2015.¹⁰¹ This election marked the first time power changed between differing political parties without widespread violence.

The internal political developments of Nigeria are vital to the relationship between Nigeria and the United States. Since Nigeria has strong regional and continental influence, a strong pro-US Nigeria is vital to US foreign policy in all of Africa. According to Congressional Research Service (CRS) staff researcher Lauren Ploch, the United States considers Nigeria, “to be among the most important on the continent.”¹⁰² The United States stands to gain exponentially by placing Nigeria among the titans of Africa (i.e. Egypt, South Africa, etc.). Should Nigeria demonstrate that democracy can combat corruption and develop as a strong democratic nation, the US stands to gain a powerful and resource rich ally.

The ‘War on Terror’ has fundamentally changed the focus of foreign relationships for the United States. Nigeria’s oil resource availability and global counter-terrorism

¹⁰¹ “Nigeria election: Muhammadu Buhari wins presidency,” BBC.com, last modified April 1, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858>

¹⁰² Congressional Research Service, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, by Lauren Ploch. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), i.

operations are significantly more important to the United States. Terrorist organizations are seeing oil as a vulnerability to the United States. This is a major change from the Cold War dynamic that dominated the mid to later parts of the twentieth century where competing political systems dominated foreign policy. This change is a result of an increased understanding of limited oil supply and the new complexity of international relations. The United States must directly appreciate the ethnic diversity of Nigeria to protect its interests in this new political arena where policy decisions affect the Nigerian voter. Discussed later in depth, the terrorist group Boko Haram initially sought to expand its strict Islamic beliefs within the Islamic community in Nigeria.¹⁰³ Eventually Boko Haram used the existing religious divide in the country to cause a schism that not only fostered internal turmoil but caused significant foreign relation problems for Nigeria.

Nigeria is a recipient of various types of aid from the United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. According to Senior Deputy Administrator for Africa (USAID) Sharon Cromer, the goal of the United States “...is not to unilaterally plan or implement development work, but rather to help Nigerians come together to solve and address their own problems.”¹⁰⁴ United States’ programs explored in this chapter demonstrate Nigeria’s high level of importance to the United States in relation to Africa as a whole, however, fail to rate Nigeria with similar importance on a global scale. Currently, the United States still favors investment on the premise of partnership with its European counterparts.

¹⁰³ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa’s troubled Titan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2012, 54.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *A Closer look at Nigeria: Security, Governance, and Trade: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs*, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., 2012, 9.

Section One: Political/Military Relationship of US and Nigeria, 2001-2014

The combination of internal political and military relationships represent a vital connection between a military and its civilian rule. Aid programs incorporate both military and political motivations that are controlled by politicians. Since the United States and Nigeria do not belong to the same military alliances (i.e. NATO), analyzing the military relationship is best done by looking at aid programs, which are controlled politically.

The United States relies heavily on the State Department in funding programs including those designed for military use (i.e. Foreign Military Financing). The State Department also handles more conventional aid programs aimed to decrease poverty. The aim of this analysis is to use investment rates as a means to determine how serious the United States is in investing in Nigeria. Program dollars designed to reduce poverty in Nigeria will be compared to dollars spent elsewhere on the continent. How money is spent is key to seeing what purposes the United States feel are most important to pursue in Nigeria

The United States State Department budgeted just under 721 million dollars in aid programs to Nigeria for FY 2015.¹⁰⁵ The FY 2015 request is up from FY 2013's budget of 699 million dollars. Overall, the United States clearly sent a message that Africa is the place of interest for the United States to develop stronger ties. This message is seen as the US State Department's total budget was reduced by 2.1% from FY 2014 to FY 2015 yet

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State. *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 2015*. By U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. United States Government Printing Office, 2014, 154-177.

the total budget for Africa increased 12.7%.¹⁰⁶ In a political climate where the United States is finding it difficult to justify foreign investments to its citizens, these numbers are impressive.

In this analysis, total budget numbers are viewed as a rough guide to how important a particular country is to the United States. However, it fails to give any reasoning of why the United States views a country (or Nigeria in this case) a particular way. To use foreign investment as a means to determine this, individual aid programs have to be analyzed. These priorities will explain what the United States sees as problematic to the relationship between the United States and Nigeria.¹⁰⁷

The programs analyzed are: The African Development Program; President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); Global Health Programs via USAID; Global Health Programs via the State Department; and Development Assistance. After reviewing these 'civilian' based programs, an analysis of selected military assistance programs will be assessed.

In 2001, Nigeria became a participant in the US African Development Foundation (USADF).¹⁰⁸ According to USADF's website, the foundation is a "...African-led development [program] that grows community enterprises by providing seed capital and technical support."¹⁰⁹ The program focuses on sustaining agriculture. Agriculture is a key

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Designed to identify issues the US government sees the Nigerian Government is having to be stable functioning government and not tackle direct social issues of the country.

¹⁰⁸ "Nigeria," African Development Foundation, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.usadf.gov/nigeria.html>.

¹⁰⁹ "About USDAF," African Development Foundation, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.usadf.gov/about.html>.

sector of the Nigerian economy that can help the country avoid relying so heavily on the export of crude oil.¹¹⁰ Nigeria is slated to receive approximately 2.9 million of the 24 million (or about 12%) budgeted for this program.¹¹¹ This program only operates in nineteen countries which additionally points to a comparably small investment in Nigeria¹¹² as Nigeria represents much more than 12% of the total population of these countries.¹¹³

PEPFAR is a program developed under the George W. Bush administration and initially pledged 15 billion dollars to combat HIV/AIDS in some of the poorest nations of Africa.¹¹⁴ Today, Nigeria receives the highest amount of PEPFAR funds.¹¹⁵ April 27, 2007, House Representative Tom Lantos addressed the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and said, "... Congress will reauthorize this [PEPFAR] crucial HIV/AIDS law and will fully fund HIV and AIDS programs in the poorest of countries on our planet."¹¹⁶

PEPFAR is a large portion of the State Department's budgeted aid money, however, it is not the sole program. The State Department's budget for health related aid programs is divided into two main groups; the first is Global Health Programs via the

¹¹⁰ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa's troubled Titan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights*, 112th Cong., 2012, 10.

¹¹¹ "Nigeria," African Development Foundation, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.usadf.gov/nigeria.html>.

¹¹² "About USDAF," African Development Foundation, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.usadf.gov/about.html>.

¹¹³ Inferred due to it being the most populous country on the continent.

¹¹⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks on PEPFAR, may 30, 2007," *Speeches in the Rose Garden*. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/450977295?accountid=10422>.

¹¹⁵ "U.S. says Nigeria remains largest PEPFAR partner," last modified February 17, 2015, *AllAfrica.Com* Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1655908653?accountid=10422>

¹¹⁶ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *PEPFAR: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007, 54.

State Department and the second is Global Health Programs via the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Combining these two categories, the agency reduced its budget by 4.61% from FY 2014.¹¹⁷ This reduction came during a turbulent financial time for the US where reductions were the norm.

Besides PEPFAR, aid money assigned to handle health related problems target malaria, malnourishment, maternal and child health, influenza, and tuberculosis among other diseases and societal health problems.¹¹⁸ Between 2014 and 2015, Nigeria received an increase of .8% of the entire PEPFAR budget. This is highlighted due to the \$300 million reduction of the budget during the same time frame.¹¹⁹ Drastic budget cuts, (which in part, is attributed to significant financial constraints domestically) and the decision to increase the overall percentage of aid for Nigeria, demonstrates the importance that United States officials have given Nigeria.

Nigeria is expected to receive 11.9% of the Global Health Programs – USAID (GHP-U), which is the highest level for a single country in Africa.¹²⁰ The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is expected to receive the second highest, getting 9.4% of the budget for FY 2015. This funding level remains relatively consistent since 2013, with changes that amount to approximately a half of a percent.¹²¹ The GHP-U budget allots 54.1% of its total budget if FY 2015 to African nations, which is consistent since 2013.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State. *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 2015*, 68.


¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 68-75

¹¹⁹ President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief, "Congressional Budget Justification Supplement 2014," <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/222643.pdf> and President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief, "Congressional Budget Justification Supplement 2015," <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/222643.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2015).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 154

¹²¹ *Ibid.*


Nigeria's allotment out grew the budget for all of Africa by .8% during the same time period.¹²² This is highlighted below in Chart 2.1.



The Global Health Programs – State Department (GHP-S) sends 62% of its total to African nations, up from 58.3% in 2013 and 59.2% in 2014. This program does not increase the budget for programs designed to help Nigeria in the same manner as the GHP-U, however, it maintains consistency that demonstrates the United States values the importance of a healthy Nigeria. The GHP-S budgets 13.7% of its available money to Nigeria, up .1% from 2014 and down .3% from 2013. Such small changes, even in the negative explain that funds to improve the social standing of ordinary Nigerians is important to the United States. Even as these numbers reduce, Nigeria remains the

¹²² Ibid.

number one recipient of GHP-S aid money over South Africa, who will receive 12.2% of the program money in 2015 for African nations.




The Development Assistance Fund (DAF) “supports the development principles outlined in the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD-6), a policy framework that elevates global development as a key pillar of American power alongside defense and diplomacy.”¹²³ Since the purpose of the DAF is to develop ties based on strong democratic values and help improve and develop emerging markets, the relatively small investment in Nigeria via this fund is an indication of concern on behalf of the United States. Nigeria only receives the fifth highest level of assistance while being the largest economy on the continent. Concern about political corruption has been a known concern by the United States for some time. This concern is demonstrated by Secretary of

¹²³ Ibid., 76.

State John Kerry’s public calls to the both the Nigerian government and the Nigerian people on the importance of keeping peace during the 2015 elections and ensuring that the elections occur without delay.¹²⁴

The DAF budget request in FY 2015 reaches 26.1 billion dollars. Nigeria stands to receive 89.4 million, making up 8.3% of the 26.1 billion dollars. Nigeria’s portion increased 1.8% since 2013. The budget also shows the same consistency seen in the GHP-U and GHP-S budgets as the total allotment for Africa decreases yet Nigeria is able to maintain a consistent percentage of the overall budget. In this case, the overall budget for DAF related programs in Africa reduced 5% from 2014, yet Nigeria’s allotment increased by 1.8%.¹²⁵




¹²⁴ “U.S. - Nigeria’s election must hold as scheduled,” last modified January 26, 2015, *AllAfrica.Com* Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1648192796?accountid=10422>

¹²⁵ U.S. Department of State. *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 2015*, 158.

In addition to programs managed solely by the State Department some programs are managed in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD). These programs include: the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and International Military and Education Fund (IMEF). These programs were selected based on the type of program (i.e. Foreign Military Sales) in order to view a cross-section of various types of military programs. These cross-sections cover, military equipment, training, and counter-terrorism. Data between FY 2010 and FY 2014 is used in this analysis.¹²⁶

Chart 2.4 depicts budget levels the United States Government allotted to Nigeria in military related programs. Most notably is that FMS outpaced any of the other programs by a far margin. The data below shows that though FMS is the largest expenditure, however, the CTFP enjoys the largest increase during this time period. The CTFP receives a 99.8% increase from 2012 to 2013 where FMS during the same period sees a 14.3% decrease.

¹²⁶ Data for FY 2014 is an estimate, as often programs financially allotted in FY 2014 can continued into FY 2015 and an actual number may not be available.



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According to the Defense Cooperation Security Agency (DSCA), the FMS program is established to sell arms to nations where the President of the United States determines that such sales are pertinent to the security of the United States.¹²⁷ DSCA also notes that these sales are funded by both the US Government and the National Government of the participating nation. The above data does not delineate what percentage of the overall FMS are paid by either the United States or Nigeria. In contrast, the data listed for the FMF and IMET-F is funded by the Department of State and CFTP is funded through the DOD.

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230192.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2015).

¹²⁸ "Foreign Military Sales (FMS)," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed March 14, 2015, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms>.

The political relationship between the United States and Nigeria is complex. This relationship is rooted in European colonialism, specifically by the British, yet was not truly formed until the Cold War. The diverging results of where the countries ended up in the 21st century is a direct result of the United States adopting a version of imperialism rooted in British colonial rule. The United States became a superpower and for nearly 200 years, Nigeria continued under colonial rule. During that nearly 200-year head start, Nigeria became a nation of internal turmoil that continued to be exploited for natural resources where the United States developed as an independent nation. The United States was able to develop strongly under the auspices of 'globalization' and further developed British imperialistic tactics. Buba Misawa, a professor of Political Science at Washington & Jefferson College, stated in an interview, "The West must understand that one-sided globalization or imposition of global values is wrong and is only meant to breed neocolonialism."¹²⁹

The United States developed relations with Nigeria solely based on the need to contain the spread of communism at the outset of the Cold War.¹³⁰ The United States has feuded with Nigeria on many occasions, even to the issuance of sanctions against Nigeria. However, regardless of the issue between the nations, John Ayam points out that the United States has been careful not to place sanctions on Nigeria's oil industry and in turn, economic relations seemed to have continued during otherwise tumultuous tides in their relationship.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Misawa, Buba, "Nigerian scholar talks African politics." Michigan Citizen (Highland Park, MI), Mar. 16, 2002.

¹³⁰ John A. Ayam, "The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations," Journal of Third World Countries, no. 2 (2008) 117.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has changed its focus in Nigeria from the spread of communism to other policy positions. These positions outlined in government proceedings as early as 1996 continue to the present day. Chief among these policies that steer the relationship between the United States and Nigeria are: the implementation and continuation of democracy in Nigeria, combating the illegal drug trade, and the defeat of rising Islamic terror networks.¹³² Though the modern state of this relationship still covers these topics, it is the priority of these topics that have changed. Presently, the impact of Islamic terror networks across the world has significantly impacted the interests of the United States. As a result, efforts to quell Islamic terrorists by the United States have grown and are greatly influencing both this relationship and the increasing need for the United States to rely on Nigeria.

The political positions like those stated above regarding globalization and its relationship to neocolonialism may exist, however Nigeria is one example that attacks that notion. During the history of the United States and Nigerian relations, Nigeria was quick to stand firm on African issues that did not agree with US interests. As discussed in Chapter One, relations between the two nations often turned cold during Nigeria's military regimes, due to political issues directly related to Africa as a whole. Specifically, Chapter One discussed how relations soured because of opposing stances on the apartheid regime in South Africa and over the political leadership of Angola. These disagreements demonstrate that globalization kept national economies together while social issues tore at the seams of the very relationship. A win for globalization.

¹³² George E. Moose, "Assessment of U.S.-Nigerian Relations," U.S. State Department Dispatch 31, no. 6 (1995): 603.

In President Olusegun Obasanjo's first inaugural speech after winning the Nigerian Presidency, he reaches out to the world, in particular the Western world for both assistance and closer ties. He states in part, "... We call on the world, particularly the Western world, to help us sustain democracy by sharing with us the burden of debt which may be crushing and destructive to democracy in our land."¹³³ President Obasanjo's speech resonates a feeling a closeness with a world that once depleted Nigeria of its own cultural richness but somehow is imperative to regain footing in a new world under a new cultural identity. Author Chris Abani makes an interesting point when he writes, "While I do believe that American imperialism is destructive and its sense of entitlement unbridled, I have grown tired of this European sport of yankee bashing because I think it is easy and because the Europeans have no moral authority to do so."¹³⁴ Though Abani highlights the destructiveness of American Imperialism, he leaves the door open for better ties between the two countries based on the need and not on moral grounds which the Europeans have tried to utilize.

Section Two: (American Interests in Nigeria (as it relates to Terrorism)

The term Boko Haram is a nickname used to describe the group formally dubbed, "Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad," which stands for "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad."¹³⁵ According to

¹³³ Oboteukudo, Solomon, *The Inaugural Addresses and Ascension speeches of Nigerian Elected and Non-Elected Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1960-2010*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2010), 132-133.

¹³⁴ Chris Abani, "The American Empire: A Libretto in Eight Movements." In *How They See Us*, edited by James Atlas, 175-185. (New York: Atlas & Co. Publishers, 2008), 177.

¹³⁵ Daniel E. Agbiboa, "(Sp)oilng Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State Response," *A Journal of Social Justice* 25, no. 3 (2013): 432.

Daniel Agbibo, the term Boko Haram is derived from the Yoruba language meaning “Western education is forbidden,” though he states Boko Haram does not approve of the terminology because it fails to encompass all of Western culture.¹³⁶

First created in the Borno state, the concept of a group fighting against cultural norms was not new. Boko Haram was established in 2002 and was seen as a group that focused on the adaptation of “western” culture and its influence in Nigeria.¹³⁷ Boko Haram main focus is to use the concept of an Islamic *jihad* to re-establish a suitable Islamic society similar to the efforts made by its colonial (and pre-colonial) predecessor, the Sokoto Caliphate. The simplistic connection between Boko Haram and the Sokoto Caliphate is outlined by Professor Daniel Agbibo. He explains that both organizations initially fought for the existence of a religiously pure society that grew into a political movement.¹³⁸ Both the Sokoto Caliphate and Boko Haram’s ambitions for a *pure Islamic state* remain focused on Northern Nigeria.¹³⁹

Jennifer Cooke, the Director for Strategic and International Studies has argued that Boko Haram was the first group to utilize “terrorist” style tactics.¹⁴⁰ But there are precedents during the secession of Biafra, terror style bombing tactics were used to allow Biafra to have “just cause” in seceding from Nigeria as a whole. Biafra supporters would

¹³⁶ Ibid., 433.

¹³⁷ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security, *Threat from Boko Haram: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, 5.

¹³⁸ Daniel E. Agbibo, “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective,” *The African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review*, no. 1 (2013) 145.

¹³⁹ “Isis welcomes Boko Haram's allegiance and plays down coalition 'victories'” *TheGuardian.com*, last modified March 12, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/isis-welcomes-boko-harams-allegiance-and-plays-down-coalition-victories>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 11.

attack Biafran targets to blame Nigerian Federal Forces. The political purposes of the two bombing campaigns may have been different but the tactics were eerily the same.

Presently, a major concern for the United States is that Boko Haram is growing from a domestic problem for Nigeria into an international concern based on increasing radical Islamization of people across the globe. On March 12, 2015, headlines across the world published that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) welcomed Boko Haram's pledge of support for the increasingly violent group.¹⁴¹ Boko Haram has yet to attack any target outside its established area (which does include some parts of Chad and Niger), but it does show potential of becoming an international problem. Boko Haram's headline attack at the United Nations facility in Abuja does demonstrate a potential desire to be viewed as an international group.¹⁴²

Evidence has been collected that Boko Haram is strengthening ties with groups such as al-Qaeda and the Maghreb (AQIM). This evidence is based on intelligence that shows Boko Haram and these groups are sharing tactics and education.¹⁴³ Jennifer Cooke acknowledges this evidence and downplays the possible meaning stating that "there is little sign [...] of any global or even regional ambitions on the part of Boko Haram leadership."¹⁴⁴ Cooke also sees Boko Haram as a group fracturing as it seems splinter on

¹⁴¹ "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Who Are They and What Do They Want?" Nationalgeographic.com, last modified May 8, 2014. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140507-boko-haram-nigeria-borno-state-maiduguri-mohammed-yusuf-abubukar-shekau-goodluck-jonathan-world/>

¹⁴² "Abuja attack: Car bomb hits Nigeria UN building," BBC.com, last modified August 27, 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957>.

¹⁴³ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security, *Threat from Boko Haram*, 3.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

activities that can be seen more as a criminal entity and less an ideological terrorist group.¹⁴⁵

Arguing that a group has ties to well-known international terrorist groups while in the same breath saying the group is driving towards a domestic criminal enterprise fails to acknowledge why the relationship between the groups exist at all. Even if Boko Haram splits, there is little doubt that a faction will remain that will subscribe to an international terrorism ideology. The result is that Islamic terror networks will have a foothold in Nigeria. As much as the United States Government states that Boko Haram is an internal problem for Nigeria, the aid money, in particular military oriented money acknowledges the possibility that Boko Haram has potential of growing internationally. General Carter F. Ham stated that, “terrorist organizations in East Africa, in the deserts of northern Africa and in Nigeria ‘have very voiced an intent to target Westerners, and the U.S. specifically.’”¹⁴⁶ The General’s singling out of Nigeria adds a certain significance to this possibility.

There have been remarkable changes in the Arab world since 9/11, changes that alarm the United States. As a result of the ‘Arab Spring’ civil resistance movements, the United States has found itself in a ‘Catch 22’ regarding some nations. The prime example of this ‘Catch 22’ is Egypt. A democratically elected government was in power and developed strong ties with the US. As a result of social change the country fell to military rule that led to a new democratically elected government. This new political power in

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ “Three Terrorist Groups in Africa Pose Threat to U.S., American Commander Says,” NYTimes.com, last modified September 14, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/three-terrorist-groups-in-africa-pose-threat-to-us-general-ham-says.html?_r=0.

Egypt was not in favor of strong ties with the US. The Egyptian military next led a coup and installed a new pro-US government. This new government stretched the concept of democracy in how it attained power. The US's relationship with the new Egyptian government is concerning at best. For the United States, Nigeria cannot become a similar situation.

Author Peter Jones explains that there are three characteristics that led several countries into an Arab Spring. They are the lack of economic opportunity, poverty, and a repressive regime.¹⁴⁷ Currently, Nigeria is experiencing two of the three, with the third (repressive regime) disputed. The most recent election, when sitting President Goodluck Jonathan peacefully conceded his reelection efforts to Muhammadu Buhari was a positive event that helped prevent the perception of a repressive regime in Nigeria. Jones also explains that economic opportunity is based more on the population's perception of the issue and not rooted in the actual levels of opportunity.¹⁴⁸

Analyzing the potential hazards both politically and economically, it becomes clear the United States cannot afford a political uprising in Nigeria. Should an event happen, it is most likely the regime would not be supportive of the United States; resulting in uncertainty in trade agreements with a country that supplies a vast amount of oil to the United States. This concern is also evident when Secretary of State John Kerry is seen meeting with President Jonathan and now President-Elect Buhari about actions of the men and their parties after the election results are published. Specific concerns cited

¹⁴⁷ Peter Jones, "The Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications," *International Journal* 67, no. 2 (2012): 449.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

in media outlets were specific to possible suspension or delaying of elections and dispute over results.¹⁴⁹ Secretary Kerry's actions by itself would not constitute involvement in Nigeria's election, but it does give propaganda to individuals with agendas that conflict with US interests.

Concerns for a legitimate election process is nothing new for Nigeria and interested parties. A high-ranking official such as the Secretary of State of the United States would not typically get involved in foreign elections because of potential claims of election rigging.¹⁵⁰ Election fraud in Nigeria is more of a norm than an exception. Explaining the results of the 2003 presidential election in Nigeria, Sola Tayo explains that there were reports President Obasanjo received upwards to 100% of the vote in areas that never had open polling stations.¹⁵¹ Tayo continues to explain that Obasanjo's tactic of hand picking a successor after being denied the ability to change term limits, was a way for Obasanjo to control the government after his presidency.¹⁵²

Evidence shows that United States political interests in Nigeria rely heavily on the security of the nation. Motivations for the underlying need of political stability are a separate matter, however, political stability is the foundation the United States needs to create a lasting and positive relationship with this giant country. In the US House of Representatives, during a hearing, it was said that the "U.S. engagement with the

¹⁴⁹ <http://naija247news.com/2015/03/john-kerry-the-world-is-watching-nigeria/>

¹⁵⁰ "John Kerry: The world is watching Nigeria," NAIJA24news.com, last modified March 24, 2015, <http://www.naij.com/375432-john-kerry-broke-us-rule-to-visit-nigeria-akinyemi.html>.

¹⁵¹ Sola Tayo, "Big Men and Ballot Boxes," The World Today, March 2007, 15.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 16.

Nigerian Government is based on mutual respect, mutual responsibility and partnership, and it is consistent with the new U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa.”¹⁵³

Combined with the United States’ focus on the recent Nigerian election and historical interactions that avoided direct involvement in Nigerian affairs, it is evident that the United States sees more importance in establishing a reputable government than receiving short term economic benefits. This is one reason it would be very unlikely to see United States military in any sizable amount in Nigeria. When Boko Haram kidnapped over two hundred girls from their school, the United States was careful to avoid deployment of any ground forces and instead offered intelligence support.¹⁵⁴ A noticeable presence of US troops in Nigeria would offer opponents propaganda about American Imperialism in Nigeria.

Efforts to “normalize” and establish a functioning government that serves all of Nigeria is vital to the interests of the United States. Currently, the Boko Haram threat is an opportunity for the United States to assist Nigeria in establishing this very government. Boko Haram plays into the post-9/11 narrative that gives relevance to the United States international presence, though is small enough that the Nigerian government has the ability to handle the matter with proper training and guidance. Unfortunately, the United States falls into a separate narrative that perpetuates the colonial years and slave trade. If the United States involves themselves too much, Boko

¹⁵³ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa’s troubled Titan*, 8.

¹⁵⁴ Jason Warner and Jacob Zenn, *After girls’ kidnapping, Nigeria must step up*,” *Boston Globe* (Boston, MA), May 15, 2014, Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1524324122?accountid=10422>.

Haram and other organizations will be able to maximize the colonial narrative and the “us vs. them,” dichotomy that comes with dealing with western nations.

The United States will establish strong ties with Africa if it can move the policy from the Cold War era of “East vs. West,”¹⁵⁵ to a legitimatization of democracy that fears no reigning official but supports political leaders that attained power via legitimate routes. If the United States allows opponents to change the narrative of democracy, especially in Africa, to mean governments friendly to the US regardless of how they attained power, then the US will certainly lose credibility and in turn influence.

The efforts of the United States to secure long term resources from Nigeria is key to a robust and diverse natural resources strategy. Politically, Boko Haram is both an obstacle and a beneficial test for the future of Nigerian – US relations. The key political strategy for the US in attaining success is to assist Nigeria in beating Boko Haram (i.e. not the United States) and for the United States to support validly elected officials and discrediting political corruption, even if those corrupted officials favor a strong relationship with the United States.

Nigeria is a major international power in Africa. Being “the largest African contributor to international peacekeeping operations, and fifth largest in the world,”¹⁵⁶ a successful Nigeria would result in a positive relationship with the rest of Africa for the US. This “domino effect” can only be completed if the relationship between Nigeria and the United States is seen as a mutual association and not imperialistic. The United States

¹⁵⁵ The term “East v. West” and “us vs. the West” is sometimes used interchangeably. “us. vs. the West” delineates a modern exceptionalism that is reminiscent of the Cold War Era.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa’s troubled Titan*, 10-11.

stands to gain significant levels of political and economic security by nurturing this relationship with Nigeria.

In a post-9/11 world, counter-terrorism is critical for the United States to develop this relationship. By supporting the new Buhari administration, the United States will demonstrate that it has the ability to partner with a nation whose leader may not completely agree with US policy. By supporting the Buhari administration, the United States will demonstrate to the Nigerian Muslim community that the US seeks cooperation as national partners. This demonstration of cooperation is especially important because Nigeria's Muslims population exceeds the expected population in 2020 of all North African and Middle Eastern countries. According to the Pew Research center, Nigeria is expected to have a Muslim population of approximately of 96.6 million people. Egypt is the only nation in either North Africa or the Middle East that will reach a similar population size with an expected population of 93.4 million.¹⁵⁷ The additional countries' populations in these two regions range between 4 million and 40 million Muslims.

¹⁵⁷ "The Future of the Global Muslim Population." *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.pewforum.org/interactives/muslim-population-graphic/>

CHAPTER THREE

Section One: The Nigerian Economy

“No single cause can be identified to explain Nigerian’s poor economic performance over the years than the power situation. [...] We intend to attack the problem frontally through revival of agriculture, solid minerals mining as well as credits to small and medium size businesses to kick – start these enterprises. We shall quickly examine the best way to revive major industries and accelerate the revival and development of our railways, roads and general infrastructure.” Muhammadu Buhari, President of Nigeria¹⁵⁸

The World Bank ranked the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the twenty-second largest in the world in 2014.¹⁵⁹ It outranked all African countries including; South Africa which ranked thirty-third.¹⁶⁰ Nigeria’s international ranking is significant, however, it faces many challenges. Author Pascal Dozie explains that Nigeria is currently “in recession, and [...] heading to collapse.”¹⁶¹ Dozie posits that Nigeria’s road to collapse is a result of a poorly diversified economy that relies heavily on oil exports.¹⁶² The reliance of oil hurt Nigeria when world prices on crude oil dropped 61.3% from 129.43 USD per barrel in July 2008 in to 50.11 USD as of mid-July 2015.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ Muhammadu Buhari, “Inaugural Address” (speech, Nigerian Presidential Inauguration, Abuja, Nigeria, May 29, 2015), <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/read-president-buhari-inaugural-speech/>.

¹⁵⁹ World Bank, *Gross Domestic Product 2014*, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>


¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Pascal Dozie, *Perspectives on Nigeria’s Economic Development Volume I* (Ibadan: Safari Books, 2012), 14-15.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ “Petroleum & Other Liquids.” *US Energy Information Administration*, <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D>

Outlined in Chart 3.1, the total value of export dollars generated by Nigeria is heavily reliant on petroleum products. According to the United Nations, crude petroleum comprised of 70% of all export dollars for Nigeria. This reliance continued to at least 2012 when crude oil comprised 69% of export dollars. The total value of all petroleum based products comprised 84% of all exports.¹⁶⁴ Nigeria’s heavy reliance on petroleum solidifies Dozie’s argument.



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¹⁶⁴ “Country Profile,” *United Nations*, accessed August 10, 2015, <https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA>

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies Nigeria's economy as a Low-Income Developing Country.¹⁶⁶ The IMF presents the Nigerian economy as "large and diverse,"¹⁶⁷ a claim not well substantiated. According to the IMF, Nigeria will continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace than during the oil price spike in the early 2000's.¹⁶⁸ What the IMF identifies accurately is that Nigeria has the largest GDP of all sub-Saharan countries.¹⁶⁹ As explained in Chart 3.1, the IMF also identified the importance for Nigeria to diversify their export portfolio. The IMF estimates that Nigeria will reduce oil exports by six percent of GDP in 2015.¹⁷⁰

The concern for the Nigerian economy grows as the value of crude oil demonstrates instability. Due to crude oil losing approximately half its value from \$94.04 per barrel in 2008 to \$56.35 in 2009, Nigeria whose oil and oil related exports account for 80% of all GDP, is gearing towards an economic collapse. The IMF singles out Nigeria as the country who faces the "most severe" challenges as a result of the decline in oil prices in the world market.¹⁷¹

In addition to Nigeria's poorly diversified economy, several other factors have been identified as significant contributors to growing economic problems. Among many challenges, infrastructure and in particular electricity has hampered growth in the

¹⁶⁶ International Monetary Fund, *Now is the Time: Fiscal Policies for Sustainable Growth*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Publishing Services, 2015, 60.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ International Monetary Fund, "International Monetary and Financial Committee" (Committee Report, Washington DC, 2015), 1.

¹⁶⁹ "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2014 Article IV Consultations with Nigeria," IMG.org, last modified March 4, 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1591.htm>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ International Monetary Fund, "International Monetary and Financial Committee" (Committee Report, Washington DC, 2015), 9.

country. Unlike the United States, where the idea of electrical power is an after-thought; the lack of an electrical grid prevents economic growth. Outside of the passing storm, power outages are not commonplace for the majority of any major economic country. Rolling blackouts, designated times of power outages are a thing of the past for major economic powers. As a result, these nations may not appreciate real challenges Nigerians view as vital to growth.

According to a World Bank study, 80% of business firms in Nigeria attribute the availability of electrical power as the main constraint to business growth.¹⁷² If businesses are unable to remain open to produce goods and services, both the need and availability declines and hampers economic growth. Nigeria is facing a critical point where diversification of their economy is becoming a necessity; and the lack of electrical power becomes a main problem to address. The World Bank says that the lack of electricity primarily affects small to medium size businesses and can attribute to an overall loss of 10% to those companies.¹⁷³ Consulting group Adam Smith International reported that Nigeria losses approximately \$130 million in GDP annually as a result of power availability. The group further identifies that 50% of Nigerian houses are not connected to a power grid.¹⁷⁴

As alarming as the World Bank is regarding Nigeria's economy the IMF takes a more optimistic approach to Nigeria's current economic plight. According to the IMF,

¹⁷² Giuseppe Iarossi and Peter Mousely and Ismail Radwan. *An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Nigeria*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009, 4.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 21.

¹⁷⁴ "The light is getting brighter in Nigeria," Theguardian.com, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/adam-smith-international-partner-zone/nigeria-power-electricity-africa>.

Nigeria's economy has grown an average of 6.8 percent a year since 2012.¹⁷⁵ Though the IMF published this percentage in 2015, it is unclear how many years it calculated to determine this average. As optimistic as the IMF may view Nigeria's economy, it still acknowledges a lack of critical infrastructure identified by the World Bank. "...Nigeria still lags its peers in critical infrastructure and has high rates of poverty and income inequality."¹⁷⁶


In addition to shortages of electricity as a major impediment to overall economic growth for the nation, transportation and finance have been identified as critical necessities that prevent economic growth. These constraints identified by the World Bank and displayed in Chart 3.2 below provides valuable information about the perception of how to improve the Nigerian economy. The information demonstrates that most see infrastructure (physical and monetary) obstacles as top concerns whereas social obstacles (i.e. crime and political corruption) are view as less important. The survey identified seventeen major constraints (of which the top nine used in Chart 3.2) to economic growth. The top seven constraints involve infrastructure problems.

Nigeria is often in world news for terrorism related problems. It is surprising that crime only ranks as the ninth largest hindrance to growth. Nigeria is also known for large amounts of political corruption, specifically as it relates to oil revenue; yet that only ranks as the eighth highest constraint. In the weighted value given by the World Bank's ICA

¹⁷⁵ "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2014 Article IV Consultations with Nigeria," IMF.org, last modified March 4, 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1591.htm>

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

survey¹⁷⁷, both corruption and crime are given over fifty percentage points less than power availability, which is listed as the number one constraint.



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Overall, the Nigerian economy is plagued with uncertainty and an unhealthy reliance on a single natural resource whose value is in steady decline. Though crude oil will still be a vital part of the Nigerian economy, without diversification the country will be subjected to the will of the world oil market, a market manipulated by world super-powers. Smart investments by both international and Nigerian-national level businesses and organizations to improve work environment will grow this wayward giant to a continental power.

¹⁷⁷ The entire survey weighs information based on Exporting zone, firm size, ownership, industrialized zone, and regulatory environment. For purposes of this paper only firm size and totaled weighted value are represented.

¹⁷⁸ Giuseppe Iarossi and Peter Mousely and Ismail Radwan. *An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Nigeria*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009.

Section Two: The United States and the Nigerian Economy

I want to emphasize that for the United States, Nigeria is an increasingly important strategic partner. Nigeria has a critical role to play in the security and prosperity of this continent and beyond... [The United States] stand[s] ready to work with the Government of Nigeria, the Nigerian people, and whomever they elect next month continue – to continue building on the important partnership that we share.~ US Secretary of State John Kerry¹⁷⁹

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 undoubtedly changed foreign policy for the United States in dramatic ways. The Bush Doctrine¹⁸⁰ created a new foreign policy that took the Monroe Doctrine to an extreme and engaged US powers in foreign lands at an unprecedented level outside of declared war. The effectiveness of the Bush Doctrine is not in debate here, however the effects it had and continues to have on relations with Nigeria are great. In summary, the Bush Doctrine established three concepts. These concepts are: the United States is the only world superpower; the United States has the right to use pre-emptive force; and the United States will act alone to protect Americans.¹⁸¹ This doctrine has turned foreign policy dialogue from a mix of economic and security concerns to strictly a security focus. This approach will inevitably cause the United States to lose strategic partners worldwide as other international powers bond with nations economically who are valuable to the United States.

¹⁷⁹ "Secretary John Kerry – Remarks at a Press Availability in Lagos, Nigeria," USEmbassy.org, last modified January 25, 2015, http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/sp_01252015.html

¹⁸⁰ Referring to President George W. Bush, 43rd US President

¹⁸¹ "The Bush Doctrine," CRF-USA.org, <http://www.crf-usa.org/war-in-iraq/bush-doctrine.html>

Relations between the United States and Nigeria must contain dialogue involving terrorism; however, it cannot dominate the conversation as it has since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 to the present day. Relations with Nigeria must be viewed as a duel approach between economics and security. Approaching a relationship with Nigeria in this manner allows the United States to take a reactive and proactive approach to security concerns while creating long lasting bonds with Nigeria.

Since Boko Haram is established in Nigeria and holds violent contempt towards the United States, a reactive approach is necessary. President Obama has continued this sole approach initially started under President Bush's presidency.¹⁸² The proactive approach to develop strong ties with Nigeria is solely economic. Assisting the strengthening and diversification of the Nigerian economy would increase the quality of life for Nigerians, prevent recruitment for terrorist organizations, and over time reduce cost of the reactive approach towards destroying terrorist organizations. Establishing strong *mutual* economic ties will increase Nigerian quality of life and create a securer United States, while limiting implications of American Imperialism.

In the previous section, three critical areas were identified that were obstacles for improvement of the Nigerian economy. These were all infrastructure based concerns: electricity, finance, and transportation. These three areas require highly refined skills the American public have attained and with skills become an opportunity for investment. The United States should focus a proactive approach regarding Nigerian relations on these three economic obstacles. The United States needs to develop a program that encourages

¹⁸² Scott Eugene, "Obama looks to new Nigerian partner in Boko Haram fight," CNN.com, last modified July 21, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/politics/nigerian-president-buhari-obama-visit/>

businesses in the United States to invest their assets into developing these three critical areas. Aid money from the United States would be tied to Nigeria allowing these businesses into the country for development purposes.


Discussed in Chapter Two, the United States invests in Nigeria on two premises: first is military/security related, and second is health related. It is clear that money is only given as a reactive approach to a problem that exists and does little on preventing problems at the source. Corporations that are based in the United States (or Europe) invest in Nigeria's resources as opposed to Nigeria. Groups such as the American Business Council (ABC) attempted to change that premise but are not influential. ABCs' three pilot programs fail to tackle the number one cause of economic obstacles; electricity. ABC identified three areas to improve Nigeria. First is transportation, an area where it may address electricity but it is not clear. The last two areas address intellectual rights and education.¹⁸³

A multi-national corporation may belong to multiple ABC's organizations (i.e. ABC promoting US and Oman partnership) and thus attention and investment opportunities become limited. The concept of the ABC is theoretically good, however, a major flaw are the competing ABC programs established for other countries. Since ABC is not unique to Nigeria it does not give a unique opportunity for the country. The United States can use existing programs (such as groups similar to the ABC) to adopt a new dialogue. This dialogue, outlined in Figure 3.1 is a new approach influenced by Herman Goldstein, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Wisconsin – Madison who

¹⁸³ "News & Events," ABCNIG.com, <http://www.abcnig.com/news.html>

create a program known as Problem Oriented Policing.¹⁸⁴ Professor Goldstein’s problem solving technique was designed to address domestic social problems, but this methodology has been adapted for foreign affairs, however I have adopted this methodology to address economic/security concerns in the international arena.

The policy starts with identifying two problems (one for each country) that need to be solved. In this case, the United States seeks security and Nigeria seeks a strengthening economy. Three key areas: Infrastructure, Investment, and Identity (the 3 I’s) are designated as three areas required to achieve security for the United States and economic growth for Nigeria. Each of the 3 I’s have ‘handlers,’ or entities who directly influence one of the critical areas. The three handlers identified are both governments of the United States and Nigeria, along with Multi-National Corporations (MNC).



¹⁸⁴ Professor Goldstein created a program known as Problem Oriented Policing (P.O.P.). A tool developed in this program was known as the P.O.P. triangle where three critical areas were identified to solve an identified problem and identify influencers of those critical areas.

This concept is designed to require the United States, Nigeria, and MNC's to directly engage each other in maintaining and improving the 3 I's. The United States would focus on developing infrastructure in Nigeria to influence more investment by MNC's. This new infrastructure would make Nigeria a round investment to MNC's and put Nigeria in a position that unites the country and influences the type of investments that are made. This system gives all participants a sense of security with ownership over a critical area, a system of checks and balances, and can lead to a stronger Nigerian economy and less propaganda opportunities for terrorist organizations.¹⁸⁵

The United States, by developing strong infrastructure such as a reliable electrical grid, it would be able to target the largest obstacle to Nigerian economic growth identified by the World Bank. This added infrastructure would influence MNC's to bring investment dollars into Nigeria and jump start the largest African economy. This influence is a result of strengthening Nigeria's infrastructure (i.e. electricity, transit, etc.) to support business growth. This increased improvement would give the Nigerian government an opportunity to redefine the Nigerian identity thus legitimizing the federal government to the highest level in its history. A strong Nigerian federal government is imperative to the United States because of its diversity (discussed in Chapter Four) as a way to keep a strong, positive presence in the country. The Nigerian government must dictate the Nigerian narrative to avoid the perception of American Imperialism.

The United States has focused primarily on the development of health programs, terrorist suppression measures. The actual development of Nigeria itself has been viewed

¹⁸⁵ As outlined in Chapter One, poor economic standards is a major factor in rebellion.


as a simple side note. Failure by the United States to identify keys areas of development, to create a healthy independent Nigeria will guarantee that Nigeria will either be forever in distress or create stronger ties with nations that are vying for world supremacy. In 2014, China signed an agreement with Nigeria to install 1,402 kilometers of railway through the resource rich Niger Delta area at a cost of almost 12 billion dollars.¹⁸⁶ The railway project not only identifies one of the top three obstacles for economic growth identified by the World Bank, it draws Nigeria closer to China and further from the United States. China has also invested in other infrastructure projects in Nigeria that include creating more access to potable water at an investment cost of 17 million dollars through the CGC Overseas Construction Group; a business arm of the Chinese government.¹⁸⁷ By using Figure 3.2, we see how China has successfully implemented economic influence to benefit their own nation.

This new approach, which China is demonstrating exceptional execution is the modern version of imperialistic tactics. Historically, we equate the notion of imperialism to be directly related to physical control of a nation and its people. Often, military and civilian control are directly involved in these efforts. Presently, imperialism is taking a new form where tactics are *passive* in comparison to previous versions. In the example below, China demonstrates how passive influence can be just as effective (and possibly more effective) as previous methods of imperialistic control.

¹⁸⁶ "China, Nigeria: NIGERIA and CHINA signs US\$12bn railway contract," Al Bawaba.com, last modified November 21, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626870369?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=10422>

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

In this example, China interacts with Nigeria in the manner Figure 3.1 outlines. As a nation, China determines to directly influence infrastructure needs with interaction from MNC's¹⁸⁸ and Nigeria. The MNC's now utilize their investment power and Nigeria integrates the plan within their national narrative bringing the Nigerian identity closer inline as a national entity. China creates strong economic ties, keeps enough control to validate dollars are spent appropriately, and establishes influence without fear of Chinese Imperialism. See Figure 3.2 below.



China's method of imperialistic control over Nigeria via business arms of their government is an 'Achilles heel' that the United States would need to exploit to gain influence in Nigeria over the Chinese. Even as the United States battles its own reputation of imperialistic tactics, the use of business not directly related to government

¹⁸⁸ In this case, China utilizes state-owned companies, a major difference from what the United States would use.

can combat the notion of undue influence of a sovereign nation. Corporations in the United States have a will of their own, a distinct sense of survival separate from the goals of government. This prevents the United States from being a direct influence of two of the three I's (which would be Investment and Infrastructure). Unlike the Chinese model, the United States, even as the superpower status that it holds, is limited to an equal share of influence. This is due to investment dollars being handled by MNC's, NGO's, IGO's, etc... whose goals are separate from the United States' effort to gain influence in the region.

The United States is better suited to successfully follow this methodology should it find the political will to enact sweeping changes. Comparing aid programs discussed in Chapter Two, people are more apt to remember who supplied them with water they utilize everyday as opposed to the vaccination shot that required a single day of their time (regardless if that vaccination likely prevented an early death). The United States can influence MNC's (particularly US based MNC's) to build and invest in infrastructure improvements deemed imperative to US and Nigerian interests via aid dollars allotted through the US State Department.

It is key to any strategic foreign policy that the United States view Nigeria as an important ally in a manner comparable to its long time European partners. There are several areas that need to be addressed in US foreign policy to accomplish a stronger Nigerian relationship. Foremost is its economic policy towards Nigeria. It is clear that the United States has relied heavily on reactive aid programs that are a result of security interests. The United States has offered assistance on the premise of terrorism without acknowledging how terrorism ever took root in the country. The current policy is

detrimental because it only addresses the tip of the iceberg (known terrorism) and ignores the mass of the problem that lies beneath the water: how terrorism continues to build a base of support in Nigeria. Efforts to improve the quality of life will slowly melt the terrorists' base away, reducing the cost of keeping terrorism at bay on yet another front on the War on Terror.

Social issues are vital to appreciating the complexity of relations with Nigeria. Economic approaches will generate higher returns on creating a lasting and imperative relationship with the United States. Changes to the relationship between these two countries came as a result of the War on Terror, but it is not too late to redefine those changes long-term. By creating a strong, viable Nigerian government, the US may focus attention and resources elsewhere. In the current world climate, those resources may prove more important elsewhere but the US cannot afford to lose focus on the continent's most populous country. The United States as with any nation, involves themselves in the matters of other nations for self-serving purposes. It must be the cornerstone of this self-serving purpose that the United States assists Nigeria in becoming a strong country that is a long-term ally and not a temporary stop on the world stage of foreign politics.

CHAPTER FOUR

This chapter analyzes the characteristics of Nigerian religious and ethnic life that affect the relationship between the United States and Nigeria. These characteristics influence the United States approach in prioritizing areas of cooperation between the two nations. Primarily, religious influences present concerns for the United States. Since the US is considered a Christian nation, it is susceptible to being portrayed as unequally supporting Nigeria's Christian population. This is problematic due to the heavily unbalanced national wealth favoring predominant Christian areas of Nigeria. If the United States shuns Nigeria's Muslim population it risks non-radical Muslims moving to support influential Islamic Nations based on shared religious identity. This potential response may bolster the existing efforts by radical Muslims and create religious strife in Nigeria.¹⁸⁹ For purposes of this thesis, 'Islamic Nations' refer to countries that have formally adopted or allow wide use of Sharia Law as a governing method. 'Christian Nations' is a more problematic term as many countries that have a religious majority population that are Christians do not have a formal acceptance of the faith in government. The United States is an example, as it is a predominant and historical Christian led nation without a formal adoption of the faith.

In Nigeria, religious identity has been a root organization in the formation of political entities. As recent as the late 20th century where twelve of thirty-six states in Nigeria have adopted Sharia Law as the 'law of the land.'¹⁹⁰ This practice is strictly

¹⁸⁹ This is eerily reminiscent of pre-cursors to the Biafran War.

¹⁹⁰ John N. Paden, *Muslim Civic Cultures and Resolution: the challenge of democratic federalism in Nigeria* (Arlington, VA: The Brookings Institute, 2005); 51.

prohibited by Part II Article 10 of the Nigerian Constitution, yet the practice remains.¹⁹¹ This contradiction amplifies the role religion plays in Nigeria. As influential as religion is, Nigeria cannot be simply defined by a religious identity. The role of ethnicity adds an additional level of complexity. Ethnicity blurs the lines between religion and government. This is due to the citizens belonging to either religion and ethnicity that fails to conform to the neat religious, ethnic, geographical lines discussed in the previous chapters.¹⁹²

This chapter will discuss the 2011 and 2015 Nigerian elections in order to analyze the level of influence both religion and ethnicity have on elections. The thesis will draw upon evidence that can be discussed when the Christian dominated Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) lost eight states from the 2011 to 2015 elections to the Muslim dominated All Peoples Congress (APC). The role of religion, especially as it influences political parties will be addressed first. Secondly, viewing the modern political landscape through an ethnic perspective; critical areas of cooperation with the US will be identified.

Section One: The Political God

“The divorce of religion from politics may be characteristic of the more developed countries, but religion remains a pervasive force in Africa. Specifically, in Nigeria, religion and politics are intricately linked. Indeed, the encroachment of religion into the political realm in Nigeria precludes the emergence of a true national identity and spirit of nationalism.”¹⁹³

~Daniel E. Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa

¹⁹¹ International Centre for Nigerian Law, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,” last modified November 20, 2015, <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>.

¹⁹² See Chapter 1’s discussion on “Simplified 3’s”

¹⁹³ Daniel E. Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa, “Boko Haram, Religious Violence, and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria,” *Journal of Developing Societies* 29, no. 4(2013): 383-384.

Nigeria's Fourth Republic started in May of 1999.¹⁹⁴ Since Nigeria became independent, it has either willingly or unwillingly experimented with totalitarianism and democracy. Generally, individual political affiliation (and in turn religious identity) determined if you supported the government in power. There have been both Christian and Islamic dictators (politely referred to as military rulers) in Nigeria since independence. During the transition between republics and totalitarian rulers, political parties have been driving forces of these transitions. Even in 2015, there is a legitimate fear that Nigeria will once again fall as a republic and become a military state.¹⁹⁵

Since the start of the Fourth Republic there were two major political parties. They are the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC). Nigeria's political party system includes fourteen political parties.¹⁹⁶ Based on the 2015 presidential election, The APC and PDP garnered over 96% of all presidential votes, demonstrating the dominance of these two political parties (see Chart 4.1 below).


¹⁹⁴ Dhikru A. Yagboyaju, "Nigeria's Fourth Republic and the Challenge of a Faltering Democratization," *African Studies Quarterly* 12, no.3 (2011):93.

¹⁹⁵ Toyin Fayola Lecture. "Convention, Culture, and Corruption: Democracy in Africa." Lecture, Plymouth State University, Plymouth, NH, March 9, 2015.

¹⁹⁶ Independent National Electoral Commission, "2015 Presidential Election: Summary of Results," last modified 2016, <http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/summary-of-results.pdf>.

Chart 4.1: 2015 Election votes based on Party Affiliation

Does not directly reflect election winner and accounts for all votes casted



The Fourth Republic started with President Olusegun Obasanjo, a former dictator of the country and a member of the PDP. Since independence, the validity of elections in Nigeria are often questioned. Recently the country proved that voters do not necessarily view previous dictatorship as a disqualifying factor. In 2015, Nigeria elected another previous military dictator to the presidency (President Buhari). President Obasanjo belonged to the PDP and was proof that the PDP was one of; if not the strongest political party in the country. Musa Abutudu states, “The [PDP] is the only [party] that could lay a claim to a pronounced electoral presence in all the six geopolitical zones [of Nigeria].”¹⁹⁷ The PDP has historically placed Christian men in places of power and the political parties have often handpicked these individuals to positions of authority.

¹⁹⁷ Musa Abutudu, “Political Parties, Elections and Governance in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective,” *Journal of Political Studies* 21, no. 2 (2011): 8.

During the Fourth Republic there have been four Presidents. All but one of them were members of the PDP. The two longest serving presidents, Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan are Christians. The president that separated their two administrations, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adu died in office. President Obasanjo supported Yar'Adu. However there have been concerns that his support came at a price and the Yar'Adu administration was a simple extension of the Obasanjo regime¹⁹⁸ After the death of Yar'Adu in office, Goodluck Jonathan served as President from 2010 to 2015, when he lost his reelection to President Buhari; a former military dictator himself and a member of the All Progressives Congress Party (APC).

The power of the PDP party leadership was significant.¹⁹⁹ The PDP 'handpicks' people to represent the party and pursue public office.²⁰⁰ The party does not outwardly broadcast that it is a Christian party. It seems there is significant weight placed on religion when it 'handpicks' candidates, and has chosen two strong Christian Presidents and one seemingly patriotic though less riveting Islamic President. Since the PDP's charter indicates that their party nominee should rotate from Christian to Muslim (and vice versa), the party's decision to support each president differently is another nod to its strong Christian roots.²⁰¹ The party supported an Obasanjo agenda with steadfast support, whereas the Yar'Adu administration was held to be a continuation of Obasanjo policies. The promotion of strong political Christian candidates and less impressive Islamic

¹⁹⁸ "Nigeria: Tough at the Top," *Energy Compass*, (2007): 1, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199525217?accountid=10422>.

¹⁹⁹ The power of the PDP is still influential, although the growth of APC influence in Nigerian politics highlights the end of an era where the PDP sat alone at the top of the political system.

²⁰⁰ Abutu, "Political Parties, Elections and Governance in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective," 7.

²⁰¹ John N. Paden, *Postelection Conflict Management Nigeria* (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 2013); 14.

candidates by the PDP could also be a result of balancing power in a critical region of the country versus power throughout the nation. The PDP

As previously discussed, oil is a dominant topic in Nigerian politics due to the country's reliance on oil revenue. The majority of oil is in the Niger Delta region, a predominately Christian portion of the country. As Ben Naanen and Kiale Nyiayaana observes, "Control of power in Nigeria has always been about control of oil revenues. No one in power in Abjua ever wants to lose control of the Niger Delta and its oil and gas resources; and the PDP has not been an exception."²⁰² This need to control a predominantly Christian portion of the country coupled with the historical creation of political parties from religious identity strengthens the Christian identity of the PDP. Yet the PDP's ability to become the largest political organization in Nigeria demonstrates it does include Islamic citizens. The PDP's has been ostensibly effective given the success (until 2015) of party affiliated presidential candidates. Nonetheless, their strategic and selective practices are seemingly, and in the words of Naanen and Nyiayaana "deleterious to democratic practice [...]."²⁰³

John Paden has explained the role of Islam in politics. The NPC and APC are historically Islamic. They want a constitutional link between religion and politics. Their goal is to implement Sharia Law as a form of government rule. Interestingly, Paden identifies four major sub-groups of political beliefs within Islam as it relates to Nigeria.

²⁰² Adedayo O. Adekson, "Civil' or 'Uncivil' Society? Revisiting the Proliferation of Ethnic Organizations in Southern Nigeria," in *State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria*, ed. Mojúbàolú Okome, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 12.

²⁰³ Abutudu, "Political Parties, Elections and Governance in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective," 8.

These groups are: the Sufi brotherhood, the Anti-innovation Legalists, traditional ethnic and locational identities, and Caliphal/Madina model identities.²⁰⁴

Paden's description of these four groups demonstrate that religion plays an important political role but often differs on the scale of influence in Nigeria as a whole. It is not difficult to conclude that Christians are not sensitive to the differences among Islamic beliefs. These four groups differ on the role of Islam nationally and regionally. Thus certain groups may try impact Christian dominated areas more than other groups. Two of these groups, the Sufi Brotherhood and Anti-innovation Legalists pose as competitors to the Christian dominated PDP. Paden explains that the Sufi Brotherhood and Anti-innovation Legalists have roots in the Sokoto Caliphate that demonstrate a historical interest in increasing the role of Islam in all of Nigeria and not the simply the predominantly "Muslim North."²⁰⁵ A major difference between the two groups "came down to the role of traditional culture in the definition of Islamic Identity."²⁰⁶

A major difference between the previously mentioned groups and the Traditional Ethnic/Locational Identities and Caliphal/Madina Identities arises on the national level of governance. The Sufi Brotherhood and Anti-innovation Legalists see the national level as a legitimate political arena that they seek to influence; whereas the other two groups primarily favor a strong regional level of government. In Paden's terminology, the

²⁰⁴ John N. Paden, *Muslim Civic Cultures and Resolutions: the challenge of democratic federalism in Nigeria*, 59.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Traditional and Caliphal identities groups see Nigeria more as a federation of emirates governed by a series of agreements that protect the local identity.²⁰⁷

The United States' policy Nigeria favors a stronger national government and seeks to avoid a regionally focused style of government. As the historical evidence provided in Chapter One and Two. Shows, regional power in Nigeria is significant and unstable. If power in Nigeria devolves into regional governments, the United States would find itself essentially brokering deals between three entities that would act as separate nations and have significantly lop-sided economic influence. Since most, if not all of the country's oil resources exist in the Niger Delta region (discussed in section two of this chapter); the fear of terrorism will evolve into an economic sector for northern Nigeria, should the US ignore development in that region. Historically, the Niger Delta has been an area of violence due to attempts to control the oil fields.²⁰⁸ The devolvement of an economic sector of terrorism will accentuate the historical violence in the region. This new economic sector has already been created as demonstrated by the financial relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.²⁰⁹

In a published article. former United States Ambassador to Nigeria Terence M. McCulley writes, "The US government welcomes continuing efforts at the national, state, and local government levels to make Nigeria's democratic vision a reality, and will continue to

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 81.

²⁰⁸ Ben Naanen and Kiale Nyiayaana, "State Failure and Niger Delta Conflict," in *State Fragility, State Formation, and Human Security in Nigeria*, ed. Mojúbàolú Okome, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 12.

²⁰⁹ Decent into in Chaos p.15-16

expand its support for strong, transparent institutions [...].”²¹⁰ McCulley states in this article that for the 600 billion dollars the United States gave to Nigeria for public health improvements to be effective, there needs to be genuine cooperation between all levels of government including the national level.²¹¹

Ambassador McCulley specifically states that Nigeria must protect equality for its citizens specifically identifying class, creed, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation among other demographics.²¹² In 2014, Nigerian politicians vocally supported a law in Nigeria that imposes stiff prison penalties for homosexuality.²¹³ McCulley’s statements and the spirit of the entire article show the importance of a strong Nigerian government but that there are differences among decisions that focus on social policy. Strong regional governments and the implementation of state Sharia Law are strictly against the United States’ interest in the region, thus the United States cannot be as forcefully against laws such as those that imprison people based on sexual orientation.

It is clear based on countless examples in American press that the ever increasing problem of religion in relations with Nigeria focuses on the role of Islam. However fundamentalist Christianity is also a concern. The recognition of full civil rights for homosexuals challenges the moral values of many Christians in the United States and in

²¹⁰ Terence P. McCulley, *Nigeria: Poised to Reap the Benefits of Good Governance*. 2013, The Ambassadors Review, 2013,32.

²¹¹ Ibid., 31.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Reuters, “Nigeria’s Anti-Gay Bill Signed Into Law By President Goodluck Jonathan,” *Huffington Post*, January 1, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/13/nigeria-anti-gay-bill-law-_n_4589227.html.

Nigeria.²¹⁴ First, this question is a prominent political issue in both countries. However, in Nigeria it is literally a question of life or death since the federal law allows for long imprisonment in some states and up to death other states.²¹⁵ This has drawn so much attention that it (sadly) earned a response from United States President Barack Obama. Journalist Kristenn Taylor reported that the United States placed a contingency on Nigeria that they must repeal laws such as the 2013 Same Sex Prohibition Act before getting aid to combat Boko Haram.²¹⁶

The role of religion is powerful and influential on international relations for Nigeria. Nigeria has the largest population of Muslims in Africa and an equally impressive number of Christians. Even with this dual-religious influence, it is a member of Oil Producing/Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); and depending on the source, at least the sixth largest exporter of crude oil to the United States.²¹⁷ Religion has a significant social role that appears to divide Nigeria's relationship with the United States, while the country is increasingly becoming a vital ally to the US. Strategically, the United States has more concern with the influence of Islam in the country than social inequalities that Christian conservatives have stridently supported. The United States has not taken the time in the past to develop strong economic ties with Nigeria that would allow the US to appropriately influence

²¹⁴ Thomas Lake, "Fear and voting on the Christian right," *CNN*, October 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/10/politics/fear-voting-christian-right>.

²¹⁵ Jane Wothaya-Thirikwa, "Nigeria Outlaws Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Organizing," (blog), January 14, 2014, <http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/nigeria-outlaws-same-sex-marriage-and-lgbt-organizing>.

²¹⁶ Kristinn Taylor, "Obama to Nigerian Christians: Change Laws on Abortion, Homosexuality If You Want Protection from Boko Haram," *Gateway Pundit*, February 18, 2015, <http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2015/02/nigerian-bishop-obama-lets-boko-haram-kill-christians-because-they-oppose-abortion-homosexuality/>.

²¹⁷ Terence P. McCulley, *Nigeria: Poised to Reap the Benefits of Good Governance*, 31.

human rights violations there. If the United States seeks to address these issues, it must develop strong ties while not ostracizing the Islamic community of Nigeria. It must also avoid pressures to legalize laws that could move Nigeria closer to enemies of the United States.

Section Two: Ethnicity and Politics

“From independence also, the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo) had been engaged in the activities of controlling the political power of the nation, with the primary aim of controlling the resources of the state. The sole ambition of controlling the economic activities of the nation has led to ‘keen hunt’, for political power especially at the centre by the various ethnic groups in Nigeria.” Terrence P. McCulley, former United States Ambassador to Nigeria²¹⁸

Ethnicity has been both a competing and complementing force to religion in Nigerian politics. Ethnicity in Nigeria has strong geographical importance. Ethnicity does not necessarily equate to religion. It is more closely tied to economic power than religion due to a geographical alignment between ethnicity and oil reserves. As noted in the previous section, oil equals power; and oil is closely tied to land. Additionally, in today’s modern Nigeria religion means various forms Christianity and Islam. Ethnic identities existed long before these two religious ideologies.

Shown in Figure 4.1, ethnicity is significantly diverse across the nation. In a simplified view, there are twelve ethnic identities defined by linguistic groups.²¹⁹ Figure 4.2 divides Nigeria into six politically generally accepted zones. These figures show a

²¹⁸ Ibid., 62.

²¹⁹ “Online Maps of General Interest: Linguistic Groups,” The University of Texas Libraries, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/nigeria_linguistic_1979.jpg.

diversified Nigeria based on ethnic identity is just as important to political power as religion. In Northern Nigeria, Hausa/Fulani appear in both the North West and North East political zones. The Gawri is a group that is strong from North West to North Central in both Muslim and Christian areas. The 2015 political elections that led to the Buhari Administration showed that ethnicity was a stronger political force than religion.




Figure 4.1



Figure 4.2

Ethnicity in Nigeria is a significant influence that the United States can utilize to prevent advocates of regional power from undermining the Nigerian Federal Government. The key will be to use ethnicity as a way to create a Nigerian national identity that combats religious division based on laws either expressly or implicitly based on religious doctrines. In this case, such a policy would combat Sharia Law that causes concern for many Christians in Nigeria, and preventing uses of the Holy Bible as justification to imprison and even kill people based on whom they love (as an example).

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ "Elections 2015," *NAIJ.COM*, 2015, <https://www.naij.com/tag/elections-2015.html>.

If citizens see judicial enforcement based on another's religion, it is only a matter of time that same justification could be used against them.

The nature of ethnicity is an important component to group identity and how it relates to politics due to the nature of membership. Ethnic identity, regardless if you subscribe to ethnic naturalism or ethnic constructionism is strictly controlled and often unchangeable. As an example, an Ibo born person in the northern portion of the Ibo state is tied to an ethnically dominant group of Christians though he or she is in an area of the country where it is common to be a Muslim. Furthermore, while it is possible for that same individual to change religions, that person cannot just decide to become a Hausa/Fulani. There could never be a member of that ethnic group even if they are the same religion. Developed language traits and family heritage plays a role in ethnicity membership and are unchangeable by the individual.

Not only is ethnic identity unchangeable, so is the geographical concentration of each. The Hausa/Fulani are dominant in the North, as are the Yoruba in the West and the Ibo in the East. The strict geographical positioning of each ethnicity determines the ownership of resource rich lands. In Figure 4.3, oil fields and exploration locations are illustrated. It is clear in Figure 4.3 that oil rich lands are located in the south and east areas of Nigeria. This oil rich land (primarily in the Niger Delta) is comprised entirely of Ibo and Ijaw ethnicities (Figure 4.1). Figure 4.3 also highlights the disparity between the Niger Delta region and the rest of Nigeria as it relates to oil and oil infrastructure which is a major economic sector for the country.




Figure 4.3

Ethnic influence has significantly contributed to the safest transition of political in power Nigeria. Not only did the transition between Presidents Jonathan and Buhari occur safely, it was first time that an elected president did not attempt to retain power beyond running a campaign. The decision by President Jonathan to relinquish power in the manner he did, had a powerful influence on people who might otherwise rally behind him to fight to retain power. Since previous arguments have been made that political powers have used ethnicity to gain support to retain power, it is imperative to acknowledge this use of ethnicity to retain peace. Comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.4 below, there is a significant push from President Buhari into the southern portion of the country. By no means does this show overt changes in the south, it does show that there is a commonality that exists that caused President Buhari to win States that may otherwise would be dominated by the PDP. Conversely, we see that President Jonathan succeeded

²²² Factbook, "Sub-Saharan Africa," last modified December 7, 2012, http://www.factbook2011.eni.com/areas/exploration-production/activity-areas/sub-saharan-africa.aspx?sc_lang=en.

in states as north as Plateau and west as Ekiti. In a country with deeply rooted religious and ethnic identities, ethnicity played a major role in the electoral outcome.

Figure 4.4 explains the 2015 presidential results by state. Figure 4.4 shows that APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari had an electable quality in southern Nigeria; an area typically loyal to the Christian PDP. Conversely, we see that PDP candidate Goodluck Jonathan succeeded in states as north as Plateau and west as Ekiti, areas that have large Muslim populations. In a country with deeply rooted religious identities, these results were affected by ethnic identities.



Figure 4.4

²²³ "Nigeria election: Muhammadu Buhari wins presidency," *BBC.com*, April 1, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858>

Comparing presidential results with the results of the election of fifty Assembly seats in two key states, it provides further evidence that ethnicity is still politically relevant. This explains the relevant nature of ethnicity since it can explain why Christian dominated areas voted for a Muslim candidate. The election gives further evidence by demonstrating that though some states voted for a candidate with differing religious views, Assembly votes still represented a likeminded religious population. For example, President Jonathan, the Christian PDP candidate was successful in the Plateau state, and are in the North that is recognized as a mixed ethnic area (Figure 4.1). During the same election, the assembly results gave nineteen of the twenty-six seats to the APC. In the Nasarawa state, Figure 4.4 shows President Jonathan garnered the most votes, however the APC took eighteen of the twenty-four Assembly seats.²²⁴ These two states point out that as a whole state, Such drastic differences are telling; in a country where presidential candidates have to prepare for physical violence, destruction of property, and other obstacles during their campaign.²²⁵ In these cases there has to be a common tie that allows a presidential candidate to be successful in a state that has demonstrated a commitment to the opposing party through their Assembly elections.


President Jonathan's success in otherwise APC dominated states was not unique. The same success was found in other states for President Buhari. President Buhari, a Muslim APC candidate was successful in many states and Ondo is just an example. In Ondo the people elected nineteen PDP candidates to the Assembly and only seven APC

²²⁴ "Official Results of State House Assembly Elections 2015," *NAIJ.COM*, 2015, <https://www.naij.com/420826-official-results-of-state-house-of-assembly-election-2015.html>.

²²⁵ Abutudu, "Political Parties, Elections and Governance in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective," 10.

candidates.²²⁶ The Governorships of these States also indicate that a common tie exists beyond religion. In both Plateau and Nasarawa states, the APC won the Governorship (even though the PDP won the presidential election in the same state).

The 2011 elections (Figure 4.5) show a map that draws closer to the religious division of Nigeria.²²⁷ It eerily recalls distant memories of British Colonialism dividing the country in to a North and South Protectorate. The 2015 electoral map displayed in Figure 4.4, demonstrates a change in the Nigerian political landscape. The 2015 electoral map draws closer to the diverse nature of the country that the 2011 electoral map disguises.



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²²⁶ "Official Results of State House Assembly Elections 2015," *NAIJ.COM*, 2015, <https://www.naij.com/420826-official-results-of-state-house-of-assembly-election-2015.html>.

²²⁷ The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) is one of multiple parties that led to the creation of the APC.

²²⁸ "Presidential election in Nigeria - 16 April 2011," *OECD.ORG*, 2011, <http://www.oecd.org/swac/presidentialelectioninnigeria-16april2011.htm>.

Figure 4.5

Ethnicity alone cannot solely explain the changing tides of Nigerian politics, but it cannot be left out of the explanation. Other nations have seen changing political beliefs throughout their histories and Nigeria will be no exception. The outlines of a landscape seen in the comparison of the 2011 and 2015 elections demonstrate that the country is embracing differences that is a path to a national identity. This national self-actualization is a positive step for both Nigeria and the United States. This election demonstrates that Nigeria is in its most critical point in its history of independence. The people have demonstrated faith in the political system and expect to see this faith as a positive investment in the future. The United States has the encourage Nigerian Nationalism while making sound decisions for their own interests. The surefire method for democracy to fail in Nigeria is if the United States oil at the primary cause for involvement in Nigeria. This is because oil is geographically concentrated and controlled by a small number of ethnic groups and the United States would focus heavily on one group and ignore the rest. If select groups are unequally favored by super-powers for oil, it may be perceived they are stealing from the national wealth. This will result in the rise of regionalism and the political landscape will return to divisions reminiscent of colonialism and the Biafran War eras.

CHAPTER FIVE

Security and economic motivations are the dominate reasons the United States and Nigeria must have a close relationship. This relationship is complicated by internal controls of each country. Nigeria is more important to the United States than vice versa. The United States is combating an emerging terrorist presence in Northern Africa with no permanent physical presence in that area themselves. Nigeria would be the best strategic and political choice for the United States to create a needed presence on the African continent.

The Global War on Terror is the start of a new era for international politics that has caused the United States to abandon Cold War style policies in exchange for policies so new, they are yet to be clearly defined. How the United States develops long term relations with Nigeria, will be an important process to define this new era. One milestone that would represent this new era is the creation of a sizeable military presence by the United States in Nigeria. Particularly, to move the US's military African Command (ARFICOM) out of Germany to Nigeria. This move would be seen as the United States becoming serious in long term investment in not only Nigeria, but Africa as a whole. Since the United States' primary purpose in Africa is to quell the rising of terror networks, Nigeria would be the most logical location to start these efforts.

Many challenges exist to develop strong ties to Nigeria. Among them, are challenges discussed in the previous chapters. They are the political relationship after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, terrorism overall, each country's economic interests, and internal politics of Nigeria. Tackling these challenges will require a successful

strategy that is outlined in Chapter Three. This strategy identified key players, their roles, and their responsibilities.

The goals of the United States to develop strong ties with Nigeria relate to social, economic, and security related obstacles the United States will face globally in the foreseeable future. Socially, the United States has a horrible record anywhere in Africa. It is time the United States views a nation somewhere on the continent as an equal partner.²²⁹ Though the term *equal* is problematic, it ironically is the best path forward to create a sphere of influence in Nigeria for the United States. Essentially, to further the United States' goal of world influence, they would need to create a powerful ally in West Africa in the form of Nigeria. For that to occur, the United States must develop the nation as a regional and even continental power. Though globalization has hurt many countries, particularly African nations, Nigeria has holds more value to the United States due to its size and pre-existing regional influence.

The role of economics is vital to any nation, but the heavy reliance on fossil fuels will force the United States to create new partners as the role of terrorism plagues their current oil interests. Finally, the United States' security concerns are increasing globally by the day. As terror groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, and ISIS continued to unify as a global force the United States will continue to be representative of all things to hate by these groups.

Historically, Nigeria and the United States both broke free from British Colonialism. Though the United States has benefited much more than Nigeria during its

²²⁹ For this purpose, I contend the United States views Egypt as a Middle Eastern country and not African.

much longer independence, this is a commonality that can be drawn upon. Nigeria faces strong ethnic boundaries and divisions. Also, Nigeria faces strong religious tension between Islam and Christianity. As a result, Nigeria experienced a deadly ethnic civil war between 1967 and 1970, that ended with bloodshed and no sign of emerging democracy.

Nigeria's history of government formations demonstrates a widespread lack of belief in the effectiveness of a federal government. With each change of government, a concern of violence with a regionalized government grew for decades, and levels of discrimination between state governments increased. As troubled as Nigeria now appears, the country has several characteristics that prevent the United States from ignoring the nation. First, it holds the largest population of any African country. Secondly, Nigeria has the largest Muslim population in Africa with an emerging radical Islamist presence. Thirdly, Nigeria is a resource rich nation.

Compared to South Africa and US European allies, the United States has historically taken little interest in Nigeria. For most of Nigeria's existence, the relationship with the United States was based on the United States' effort to contain communism. Since Nigeria was a country that had not adopted that system of governance, the United States sought to prevent the spread of the ideology to Nigeria. It was not until the 1990's and more so the 21st where the relationship between the two nations developed into a complex discussion over illegal drug trade, terrorism, and legitimate trade agreements.

For much of the Biafran War, the United States was preoccupied with the lead up to and start of the Vietnam War.²³⁰ For years, the United States did not appreciate the unique character of Nigeria. The US was almost exclusively concerned with the spread of communism rather than the needs and concerns of Nigeria. The Global War on Terror does not necessarily allow the United States to ignore political decisions of the past. It does allow the United States to develop strategies to improve national security without requiring the need to stop the spread of adverse political ideologies.

Recently, the United States has viewed Nigeria as one of the most politically significant nations in Africa.²³¹ There does now appear to be room for improved relations with Nigeria. Prior to the growth of radical Islam, the United States viewed Nigeria solely as a place to prevent communism and not one of genuine political worth. This is highlighted by the opposing positions taken by the US and Nigeria to recognize the valid government of Angola during the 1970's. Nigeria held a regional influence and fought the US over who represented the legitimate government of Nigeria. Nigeria fought to recognize the will of the people whereas the United States sought to prevent the creation of a communist regime. During this struggle, the US failed to appreciate the influence Nigeria held in the region and sought to influence nations into decisions that were one-sided and not necessarily in their best interest. The United States' alignment with South Africa during apartheid is one example of this policy failure.

²³⁰ Richard Skylar, "Dialog: The United States and Biafra," *Africa Report* 14, no. 14 (1969): 22, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1304045387?accountid=10422>.

²³¹ Congressional Research Service, *Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, by Lauren Ploch. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), i.

Once the overt battle between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism was no longer a relevant security concern, the United States did not view Nigeria as crucial to the post-Cold War political dynamics. The rise of Islamist terrorism and the growth a terrorist related economic sector changed Nigeria's significance to the US. The growing concern about terrorism in the United States, Nigeria's role in the world oil economy, and Nigeria's large population has catapulted the importance of Nigeria in US foreign policy. As a result of the changing dynamic, on the international and bilateral spectrums of the United States and Nigerian relationship, we have entered into a new era that will allow the United to redefine the relationship and further their influence on the continent. The United States must conduct an in-depth analysis of their political and military objectives, in particular as they relate to terrorism and counter-terrorism operations. To be successful the United States must dissect the economic value of Nigeria, the role religion and ethnicity in the country, and how Nigeria can be a regional hegemony that supports the United States.

A vital chapter in US/Nigerian relations started in 2015 with the election of President Muhammadu Buhari. The United States must support his election and President Buhari's role, unlike their recent response to the current coup d'état government in Egypt.²³² President Buhari can represent a turning point in relations with Nigeria. This is because President Buhari represents an administration that appears to not be a pro-American government.²³³ This representation is derived from Buhari defeating incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, whose administration was supported by the United States.

²³² Michael R. Gordon, "Kerry Says Egypt's Military Was 'Restoring Democracy' in Ousting Morsi," New York Times, August 2, 2013, Factivia.

²³³ This is not to assume President Buhari is anti-American.

It is also the first time that Nigeria will have a President in the fourth republic who is Muslim and is a previous military dictator of Nigeria.

Nigeria's petroleum driven economy fails to achieve economic diversification as petroleum accounts for over 80% of the economy. The current global political environment is impacting the value of oil. As a result of unstable global oil wealth, the Nigeria economy remains unstable. This uncertainty will have a direct impact on the solvency of the Nigerian government. This uncertainty will drive Nigeria to seek further economic ventures beyond petroleum, which is a benefit for the United States. If these ventures are not successfully sought by Nigerian federal entities, it could reaffirm the need for regionalized governments. This change is an eerie reminder of the 1967 Biafran War. The concern of stronger regionalized government is a motivation for the United States to actively participate in growing the Nigerian economy.

Added to the concern of potential regionalized government in Nigeria is the presence of global terror (unlike in the 1967 Biafran War). Since oil money focuses on the southern portion of Nigeria, the north will be one step closer to relying on the economics of terrorism and increased relations with US adversaries. Money from terror related groups, wealthy conservative jihadists, and illegal activities (i.e. ransoms, illegal oil sales, etc.) would become an economic reality. This does not mean that Northern Nigeria will automatically become a hotbed of Islamic radicals, it certainly adds one more ingredient to the recipe of terrorist safe havens.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the key to success for the United States to be effective in Nigeria uses a three pronged approach (See Figure 3.1). This approach identifies Infrastructure, Identity, and Investment roles to develop strong ties between the

United States and Nigeria. The United States must have a direct impact on Infrastructure, while appreciating the need for Nigeria and private partners to have direct influence on identity and investment respectively. The United States would act as experts on the design and creation of public utilities. They would focus on best methods to build power grids, road networks, public transportation, etc. This would be characterized as *hard influence*.

Conversely, the ability for *soft influence* on the remaining two categories (Identity and Investment) is based on a strong State Department. Outlined in Chapter Three, soft influence equates to the United States participating in dialog with actors who have a direct or *hard influence* in those two remaining categories. This is the area which the US State Department would be the US's strongest asset. Preventing the US from having a direct impact on Identity and Investment combats claims of US imperialistic motivations.

The approach based on Infrastructure, Identity, and Investment combats imperialism because it prevents any given country from exceeding authority in a separate area. Essentially, the United States has the expertise of societal infrastructure, private organization holds the purse strings, and Nigeria maintains a sense of solidarity that prevents the appearance of acting as a puppet further growing national pride. This approach is also important as it refuses to rely solely on a single source of economic worth (petroleum). The system charges the US government with the role of providing the tools and resources required for businesses to build a diverse economy.

It is clear that the relationship between the United States and Nigeria has been recently influenced by the United States' War on Terror. The global reality of terrorism that crosses all systems of government (i.e. capitalism, socialism, etc.) has evolved world

politics from the Cold War era to a Global War on Terror narrative. The United States sees the need for Nigeria to diversify its economy, however it has yet to accept a method that acknowledges the role of Nigeria in a complex world economy. No longer can economic politics be driven by the notion “you are with us, or against us.” The United States should accept that Nigeria is free to negotiate freely and with the intent to further their stature in the world. The United States must also appreciate that a strong Nigeria will be created. As Nigeria grows, it is imperative that a strong economic Nigeria views the United States as a friend.

Discusses in Chapter Four, Nigerian ethnicity and religion are not synonymous, though can often be treated that way. The country has over 250 identifiable ethnicities, across thirty-six states, and two major religions. It is unrealistic that 250 ethnicities equal two (sometimes three) religious ideologies. The political impact of religion and ethnicity are significant in Nigerian politics. Religious ideology does form a method of governmental control in Nigeria. This method is divisive across the nation as seen with the implementation of Sharia Law in some states.

An appreciation must be given to the complexity of Nigerian social diversity. Nigeria has a long history of ethnic and religious rivalry that continues in the 21st century. Economic factors in Nigeria are closely tied to religious and ethnic factors. Ownership of economic wealth, disbursement of financial gain, and political control are not answered without addressing the role of ethnicity and religion.

Religion plays a crucial role in the Nigerian government. It does fail to be as important as ethnicity for several reasons. First, ethnicity (whether based on naturalism or constructivism) is geographical in nature. Secondly, Christianity and Islam are imported

religions long after the roots of ethnicity took hold. Thirdly, the geographical alignment of ethnicity is closely aligned with the location of most Nigerian natural resources. The vast majority of the nation's crude oil reserves lie in the southern portion of the nation controlled by mainly by Ibo's and some Yoruba's. This is highlighted by the lack of natural resources located in Hausa-Fulani held areas of Nigeria.

Religion in Nigerian politics is extremely divisive. Religion, as a method of governmental control is counter-productive to strengthening a group of individuals from different belief systems. Notwithstanding, it cannot preclude someone from appreciating that belief systems influence the decisions of policy makers. The implementation of Sharia Law instills fear in Christians that Muslims would feel if the Holy Bible became a primary judicial reference. Religious activities must be personal obligations and not obligations of the state.

The changing role of religion in politics was demonstrated in the 2015 Nigerian elections. In states where a politically Christian dominated People's Democratic Party (PDP) has strong influence, a Muslim candidate won. Presidential elections saw states choose a president that did not necessarily correlate with their religious demographics. In a country where religion is influential, ethnicity still plays a major political role.

Ethnicity can produce political conflict. Ethnicity was a driving force behind a bloody civil war. Ethnicity dominates the concern over unequal economic wealth in Nigeria due to the concentration of Nigeria's oil reserves in the south and major role oil has in its economy. Additionally, ethnicity is a bond that has existed in Nigeria far longer than religion.

Religious and ethnic differences contribute to the fragility of the state. These obstacles must be conquered so that Nigeria can be a successful state. Ethnicity is an important part of Nigerian life and cannot be disregarded. This is one reason why the United States cannot be a direct influencer in developing the Nigerian identity.

In conclusion, the 21st century marks a transition in foreign politics. This transition is evidently seen in how the United States must interact with Nigeria. The politics of the Cold War have become irrelevant in the face of the War on Terror for the United States and Nigeria. The United States has demonstrated that Nigeria holds a unique value for the advancement of their political interest. The United States has demonstrated they recognize this value. The US has yet to show how they plan on improving this relationship. The three pronged approach of Infrastructure, Investment, and Identity is a starting point. If the United States chooses a method that solely focuses on the exploitation of Nigerian natural resources, it will fail in its efforts of political influence. The United States needs to develop this nation through the implementation of Infrastructure, Investment, and Identity. This will combat imperialistic rhetoric by adversaries and increase stability in Nigeria. This approach will create a safer world that will lead to a safer United States.

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